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This thesis examines the history of the Greater Dallas Crime Commission and
its effectiveness within the criminal justice system. It is a private agency  established
fifty (50) years ago to monitor and investigate the criminal justice system. Today, it
serves as a source of funding for criminal justice agencies, provides awards and
recognition forums for law enforcement and lobbies for legal revisions of the criminal
code.  The research is designed to examine their role within the criminal justice system.
Whether current crime theories are supported by the commission is central to the thesis.
There are no prior studies available of crime commissions perhaps because they
are privately funded and operated by civilians. Crime commissions do exert influence,
politically and financially, upon law enforcement.  It is reflected often in their history.
The extent of this effect is the subject of the paper.
To this end, the commission=s role in changing state laws, providing funds for
police training, recognizing prosecutors and paying awards to informants lends
credibility to their role in the criminal justice system. Their function has often changed
during the fifty-year history. If there is a deficit, it may be that the commission has the
capability, through its sphere of influence,  of  encouraging civilian actions that may
conflict with law enforcement policy. Some examples of these are included in the study. 
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Introduction 
Criminal justice agencies regularly ask the public for assistance in
locating a fugitive, to help identify unknown criminal subjects, to participate in
Neighborhood Watch Programs or to be part of Citizens on Patrol. Crime
Commissions are promulgated to organize this assistance and often to ask law
enforcement for help but more often to offer assistance. This study will examine
the Greater Dallas Crime Commission, its history, why it was organized, who
were the people instrumental in its formation and their motivation.  
Subsequently, the effectiveness of the GDCC in the past and today will be
examined with records, interviews and analysis of the data. Current crime
theories are examined in each period and measured against Commission
operations. Discussion is provided of the GDCC’s programs and functions that
conflict or support these views.
 Crime commissions have been in existence in the United States since the
World War I era. They came into existence due to corrupt and ineffectual law
enforcement at the local political level. It is/was their mission to aid in improving
the quality and honesty of the criminal justice system. As civilians with specific
interest in law enforcement, most members viewed their role as one that guarded
the criminal justice system. They would personally scrutinize the conduct of the
courts and provide assistance to police. Each commission too, would introduce
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and assist in the passage of legislation that they believed was needed to enhance
justice in Texas. In the earlier years, the commissions often paid for and directed
criminal investigations.  (Dallas Crime Commission newsletters and budgets,
1951-1972) The Dallas Crime commission has changed its focus in more recent
years and concentrates on less intrusive programs to aid the criminal justice 
system.
Examining each commission in the U.S. is beyond the scope of this study.
Records have been made available from the Greater Dallas Crime Commission
(GDCC) that will provide a basis for future commission academic reviews. 
While this crime commission has existed for more than fifty (50) years, the
events and procedures prompted, promoted or provided by the GDCC are typical
of those around the U.S. and reflect the evolution of the criminal justice system.
As society changes so have the civilian efforts of commission members. These
changes, or adjustments, equally reflect some of the basic criminal theories used
to explain crime in the new urban America. Criminal justice theories and studies
often support and conflict with the crime commission.
When the GDCC began in 1950, there were serious public concerns about
drug trafficking, liquor consumption, gambling and prostitution; crimes that were
beginning to have a serious effect on the economic prosperity of Dallas. The city
was growing with jobs that attracted people from other parts of the country and
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from rural areas of Texas. Many of the new residents were not accustomed to
Dallas= urban life nor its principles. Many saw nothing wrong with liquor, 
prostitution and certainly not gambling. These people had no local connections
and were not predisposed to discontinuing their popular pastimes. Naturally,
there were citizens who wanted to provide these services, legally or not. 
It was this type of real-life scenario that led to the organization of the first
crime commission in Dallas. Every period of its existence fostered  some changes
in its role. Studying the commission=s history and the  parallel crime history
provides the framework to evaluate its performance. Using crime data,
newspaper reports, interviews with commission members and their records helps
to place the commission into historical perspective.
There are constraints to the evaluation of the Commission as many of the
early leaders in the GDCC are now deceased and their limited writings leave
little to measure the motivations that led to their decisions. Crime records are
attainable but often do not provide sufficient information to measure their impact
on citizens. Newspapers and other historical accounts provide some supplemental
measure of the real impact from local crime. These omissions require the
researcher to deduce from the available material the presumptive reasons behind
certain crime commission  policy(s). 
This research will use available data  to analyze the effectiveness of the
GDCC. After each significant period, an examination of the criminal and other
records will evaluate the commission=s actions and whether its response was
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appropriate to the events. This will provide a better window to view the effect of
its actions and the cause that inspired its decision. When historical decisions are
congruent with crime responses then the likelihood of commission assistance to
the criminal justice system reflect a positive contribution. This then would serve
to inspire further research of all civilian crime commissions. It would also assist
in cities where citizens are evaluating their need for a crime commission. 
To date, no one has examined crime commissions in an academic format.
This effort may be used as a basis for further study. On a superficial level, crime
commissions appear to be a positive but detached force to which the criminal
justice system pays homage. They are usually made up of powerful political and
business interest of the metropolitan area.  Often members are able to generate
support for legislation that affects criminal investigations and prosecutions.
Commissions also provide funds and support for law enforcement training and
equipment and rewards to citizens who assist police in investigations. 
Two serious questions arise from the detailed study to follow:
1.Do the crime commissions enjoy too much influence over criminal
justice policy? 
2.Are they providing a useful addition to criminal justice and the public?
Within each of these questions reposes a myriad of smaller issues. This
research covers a period of fifty (50) years creating conjecture that often the
commissions efforts were justified and effective while on other occasions their
work may have been less worthwhile to the community.   
3
Crime commissions exercise considerable influence.  No one can censor
them nor change their operation or focus. So long as the commission operates
legally, they are sovereign within the area they choose to exercise, e.g., if they
decide to set up a crime stopper=s program that allows police to identify unknown
subjects and the programs funds this process they may do so. Alternatively, they
may support legislation that conflicts with the desires of area law enforcement
agencies or those of the courts.
The Dallas Crime Commission, later renamed as the Greater Dallas
Crime Commission, was created because of real and perceived crime problems. 
The crime issues that kindled the original organization, will be discussed using 
crime reports and newspaper articles describing crime in the community.
Historical law enforcement comments and discussions about crime  will help
demonstrate the pressure on city leaders to respond to the issue.
Support for much of the Commission’s work is found in current criminal
justice and sociological theories and research. Remembering that crime
commissions grew from the same practices that led to vigilante organizations, it
is commendable that so much of the work of the GDCC is encouraged by crime
studies. Other research, clearly offers guidance for future crime commissions.
There is no indication that the GDCC engaged in illegal conduct but in fact went




There are approximately 20 crime commissions around the U.S. 
that are essentially independent of each other (see appendix A). Most are
members of the National Association of Citizen=s Crime Commissions (NACCC)
but exercise independence of any central authority. They are privately financed
and administered by locally selected officers. 
 The earliest crime commissions in the United States began shortly
after World War I (WWI). Most of those early crime commissions disbanded
during the economic downturn of the Depression. The groups that formed after
WWII helped create similar groups around the country, Eg. Chicago helped
Dallas and Dallas assisted in the creation of a crime commission in Ft.
Worth(Crime Commission News, May/June,1952).
 Fear of crime was the driving force in commission development around
the United States. There are no instances of a crime commission forming without
the impetus of some serious criminal activity.  The leadership of the early
commissions was business and political leaders of the nation. One of the early
leaders in the national effort at creating citizen crime commissions was Virgil W.
Peterson who was the Operating Director of the Chicago Crime Commission for
many years.  
Peterson wrote extensively about the need for public involvement in the
criminal justice system. He noted  American history was rife with illustrations
where citizens became so distrustful of official ineptitude or corruption that they
1  Report to the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate
Commerce, Pursuant to S. Res. 202, 81st Congress, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report
No. 307, 1951. 
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formed vigilante groups and often used violence to end criminal activity in their
communities. New York City  formed the first citizen=s group to non-violently
end the hold of the Tammany Hall organization on city hall. This early group was
led by Reverend Charles H. Parkhurst. It was called the Society for the
Prevention of Crime and was organized in October, 1878. (Peterson, 1951) 
The murder of two men in a payroll robbery pushed the Chicago
Association of Commerce to appoint a committee of 10  citizens to study the
growing crime problems. They eventually recommended the permanent
formation of a A...body charged with the duty of securing the proper
administration of such laws as may be enacted by the officials charged with such
administration.@ This stilted phrasing simply meant that the organization would
study the subject of crime suppression and prevention, and secure the necessary
legislation needed to improve criminal law. 1
Kansas City Law Enforcement Association followed Chicago=s lead 
November 11, 1920. Afterwards came the Cleveland Crime Commission, the
Crime Commission of Los Angeles, and the Baltimore Criminal Justice
Association, Inc.
On August 12, 1925 a National Crime Commission was organized in New
York City in the offices of Elbert H. Gary, then head of the United States Steel
Corporation. Members in the national commission included Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, Newton D. Baker, a former secretary of War,
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and many other prominent men. In 1927 there was a national meeting of the
group in Washington, D. C. with twenty-six crime commissions represented at
the meeting. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Howard Taft,
addressed the delegation.  This national commission was defunct after only a few
years.  
This was true, too, of many of the local commissions. Only Chicago,
Baltimore  and Cleveland  commissions continued beyond 1930. Most ended
due to the economic crash of 1929 and the resulting depression. World War II
further drove local issues out of citizen=s interest in order to focus on the war
effort. 
By 1948, local concerns were revived and in June, 1948 , Peterson
addressed 2000 Miami citizens about the need for a commission in their city.
The Crime Commission of Greater Miami was established that year.  Kansas
City=s Crime Commission was re- formed in 1949, 1950 saw the birth of  the St.
Louis and Dallas Crime Commissions. By 1951 the New York Anti-Crime
Committee was functioning as was the Philadelphia Crime Prevention
Association. Tampa, Florida and Burbank, California commissions followed in
1951. By 1952 a new National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions was
formally organized and continues today, appendix A provides a list of the
commissions in the national association.
The thrust of the various crime commissions was, and is, dependant
upon local perceptions of crime in their area. Some concentrate on statistical
analysis of local crime, others toward improvement of law-enforcement
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agencies and others with organized crime, most  include some of each of these
elements.
 The most constant requirement is that the commissions are independent
of any official body. All the funding must be from the community in order to
ensure an independent appraisal of the criminal justice establishment (Peterson,
1952).
In 1952, Peterson wrote, that the Chicago Crime Commission had an
annual budget of $150,000.00 raised entirely by the commission from its
members or citizen supporters. There were 150 members but over 2,000 donors.
This budget maintained a staff of 25 full-time employees including observers in
the criminal courts, investigators and those who operate the office. They also
functioned as a victim=s information source by sending or telephoning the
witnesses of the status of the cases, when they would be needed for testimony
and when the suspect was released from jail. (A very early victim assistance
association.) The witnesses were also encouraged to advise the commission of
any new information, evidence or problems that might affect the case. This
information was then furnished to the proper authorities. Investigators
employed by the Chicago Crime Commission were former agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or military intelligence. They concentrated on
organized crime matters but did not usually collect evidence for criminal
prosecution. They observed what official law enforcement agencies were doing
and provided confidential reports to the mayor or other public officials for
appropriate action. They would conduct investigations if a miscarriage of
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justice had occurred, in these instances they did collect evidence. An example
occurred when the  commission  received a letter from a black American
complaining that his life sentence was not just and that he was innocent.
Chicago commission investigators discovered new alibi witnesses and using a
commission lawyer obtained his release (Peterson,1952).
Goals and ideology of the Crime Commissions have not changed over
the decades. The Dallas Crime Commission  varied its techniques and methods
over the years as Dallas criminal justice needs were transformed during the last
half of the twentieth century. The leadership in the Commission adjusted its
operation to inspire community involvement and the requisite needs of the
changing criminal topography. It is interesting to describe the changes in the
Commission but it is equally revealing to note the similarities of goals and ideas
between 1950 and 2000.
Discussion
Crime commissions are an outgrowth of 19th and 20th Century
vigilantism. But by the time of the Depression, most American leadership
stopped encouraging lynching and other extra-legal means of crime control.
They realized that citizen action was required but within the law of the land.
Many states proposed and passed anti-lynching statutes, efforts were made to
increase the pay and competence of local law enforcement and law enforcement
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began to require higher levels of professionalism. Each of these areas are
priorities of crime commissions.   
The history that prompted these ideas is discussed in an unpublished
M.A. thesis “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Popular Perception, Crime History
and Criminal Justice Policy@ the author points toward the historical basis for the
current get tough on crime agenda  (Latham, 1999).  Most current attitudes are
influenced by the violent history of America. The sentiments have less to do
with current politics or targeted crimes than the expectations of citizens.
America’s violent history leads us to believe this violence is going to occur
regardless of the crime or imprisonment rate; it is our historical perception of
crime.
Certain portions of this idea grew from the force needed to control and
conquer a new wilderness America. Public acceptance of violence was further
enhanced with the era of vigilantism, a revolution, a civil war, labor unrest, civil
rights= violence and legal decisions by the courts. The example used by a
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes provided that an American
should not be expected to retreat from the threat of force, which is a
continuation of the old west confrontational self-defense. It is understood that
when someone is threatened by violence, then violence is justified by the
respondent; no one is required to retreat from danger.
The study also examines historical records of violent acts, crime and
criminal justice history and is compared with the contemporaneous crime rates.
Each era is treated separately to evaluate whether the rate of crime is equal to
10
the proposed treatment offered by citizens. It is a subjective measure since more
accurate crime data did not begin until the Twentieth Century. Usually, the
evidence points to an overreaction by local citizens resulting in vigilante or
lynching actions. Occasionally, the reaction was proposed by local political and
economic leaders in the community many times led by local police authorities
(Latham,1999).
This is then expanded to the criminal justice system. If violence has
occurred, then the suspect may also be treated violently up to and including the
death penalty. These are the same ideas that have led to an increase in police
numbers and prison expansion. Despite criminal statistics analysis that reflect
the continuing static nature of crime rates, the American fear of crime drives the
development of crime policy.  Some theorize that even if the crime rate
decreased to zero, there would still be a fear of crime that would generate more
calls for prisons (Latham,1999).
 Crime commissions provided a method for citizens to discuss and act
on their concerns about crime, with the perception of history, but not the acts of
violence. Civic leaders needed an organization to provide support and
legislation for a community trying to reduce crime. Reducing crime and
improving the business climate  represented multiple benefits to the city,
particularly, those cities like Dallas that were having difficulties with
uncontrolled criminal violence. The Dallas Crime Commission provided a
conduit for citizens to influence criminal justice policy and practice devoid of
the threat of citizen violence.
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History
Dallas Crime Commission history begins, literally with a bang, the
sound of numerous shootings and bombings that had become routine in the
post-World War II city. Dallas, like most American cities was suffering from
rapid growth pains, uncontrolled gambling, drug dealing and many factions
fighting over control of the illicit businesses. The conflicts between the outlaws
led to open warfare on Dallas= streets. Newspapers carried stories of nighttime
assassinations and assassination attempts by gangsters throughout the city. City
leaders knew that some action was needed, since their actions nearly two
decades before had sparked the current problems. Local, and often national, 
newspaper headlines and radio broadcast frequently let Dallas citizens hear
about violent crime in the city. Many of the victims and perpetrators of crime
were those involved in the area’s criminal enterprises.  
The seeds of crimes of 1950 had been planted years before in a business
decision made for the Texas Centennial. Dallas= plan to host the 1936
Exhibition was a catalyst for actions that eventually led to the creation of the
Greater Dallas Crime Commission.  It was a bold gamble that paid off in
notoriety, national exposure and the 1937 Greater Texas and Pan American
Exposition. These events brought money into the city and consequently, crime. 
Actively pursued by Robert Lee Thornton, president of Mercantile
National Bank, Dallas offered the Texas Centennial Commission $7,791,000.00
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to win the right to host the Centennial. The funding came at a time when
America was trying to emerge from a world-wide depression, it was an
enormous amount for that period and won for Dallas the right to host the
exposition (Payne, 2000).
Part of the crime brought into Dallas was through the city council=s
decision to Aopen up the city@ to compete with Ft. Worths= Frontier Centennial
Exposition. Ft. Worths= celebration was produced by Broadway showman Billy
Rose with Paul Whiteman=s band and Sally Rand=s Nude Ranch. The Ft. Worth
vaudeville shows were drawing the crowds away from the massive expenditure
made by the city of Dallas. The Dallas city council decided to allow bookies, 
illegal liquor sales and encourage prostitutes to operate in houses and off the
streets. (Payne,2000)  
The organization needed to direct and manage the Centennial and the
Exposition inspired the business leaders to form the Dallas Citizens Council, a
group of business bosses with the authority to commit their money and
resources to any worthy project. It was chartered on November 22, 1937.  This
financially and politically powerful group would influence Dallas=s
development for many years including responsibility for the formation of the
Dallas Crime Commission.
Naturally, there had been crime in Dallas before the Exposition and
Centennial after all, by 1913 Dallas had over 131,000 citizens. This era was also
marked by the >social evil= of prostitution though it was not discussed openly in
polite society. It was allowed by the city to operate on a designated >reservation=
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near where Founder Bryan had settled in 1841. (East of Lamar Street, from
Cochran Avenue on the south to the MK&T railroad tracks on the north and
bound on the east by a stream known as Dallas Branch or “Frogtown@, perhaps
as many as 400 women were allowed to practice their profession
there.(Payne,2000 and Homes, 1992).
Black Dallasites were not a factor in the 1920s decision-making process.
Jim Crow laws were rigidly enforced. Post WWI era did not loosen the arbitrary
controls placed on black citizens in Dallas or most American cities. Lynching
and tarring and feathering were common. The city judge and sheriff were KKK
members along with 16,000 others by the 1920s. The KKK demonstrated for
white supremacy, and of course they were anti-crime proponents (Payne, 2000).
A strong anti-klan movement was led by C.M. Smithdeal and supported
by Ben Cabell, G.B. Dealey, Alex Sanger, and Herbert Marcus. Organized
opposition from local newspapers , the Citizen=s League and klan abuses in
other parts of the country led to their decline by 1926.
A police department and sheriff=s office existed but was ineffective and
weak. In the mid 1920s the police department had 150 officers who worked
eight hours a day, seven days a week and given one day off a month and an
annual vacation of one week. Annual salary was $1,680.00 per year for a
patrolman. The city commission did discuss providing uniforms for the officers.
 After WWI Dallas began to see an increase in crime from bandits in
Ahigh powered motor cars@ to gruesome murder cases, bootlegging and narcotics
trafficking. Drugs were available  in Deep Ellum, for instance, if you knew the
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reefer man and you were a Amuggle@ smoker, marijuana (Holmes, 1992 and
Payne, 2000). These and other consensual crimes were organized on a scale that
led to fierce and violent confrontations between the groups. 
By the end of WW II, many returning veterans were ready to terminate
the rule of the gangsters and the crimes that were damaging the progressive
Dallas business climate.  World War II veterans ran for office in the 1946
elections. Several wanted the city=s top law enforcement jobs, especially the
county=s highest criminal justice offices, sheriff and district attorney. Will
Wilson and Henry M. Wade ran for the district attorney=s office. Wilson was an
SMU graduate and Wade a University of Texas law school graduate and former
F.B.I. agent. Wilson won the election but made Wade his chief prosecutor. In
1950, when Wilson moved successfully into state politics, Wade took over as
D.A...... for the next thirty-five years. In the same 1946 election Steve Guthrie,
another veteran, defeated R.A. ASmoot@ Schmidt who had held the sheriff=s
position since 1932.
They had their work laid out for them. Gambling, though illegal, was
wide-open and anyone could gamble or buy illegally sold liquor throughout
Dallas. The best known of the gamblers was Lester (Benny) Binion. For many
years it seemed that Binion could not be put out of business. Whether it was his
careful planning or luck or the fact he had  protection, is difficult to judge from
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history=s retrospective. He was well-liked by many people, regardless of race or
ethnicity, throughout the city (Payne,2000).
More serious criminal activity was proposed by people outside of the
city. Interesting, because of the names involved, is a 1946 attempt by Chicago
mobsters to buy the assistance of the new, and they thought, naive, Sheriff
Guthrie. Dallas Police Chief Carl Hansson, who would remain chief for many
years, had assigned a detective to maintain contact with gambling figures,
including those from Chicago. Through this contact, Detective George Butler,
Guthrie agreed to meet with the mob representative,  Paul Roland Jones. First,
Guthrie notified Chief Hansson, DA elect Wilson, and Homer Garrison of the
Texas Department of Public Safety, who became an institution in the State
Police. Recording devices were installed in Guthrie=s house and recorded Jones
offering $40,000.00 per month if Guthrie would allow the gambling to
continue. They would also insure his continued reelection. On December 18,
the unofficial task force arrested Jones and accomplice Romeo Jack Natti,
quite a Christmas present for the young, newly elected or appointed officials. 
They appeared before Justice of the Peace W. L. ALew@ Sterrett, soon to be
county judge for many decades (Dallas Morning News, December 19,1946).
 Under Guthrie and Wilson there followed a series of raids on gambling
joints. Law enforcement pressure drove Benny Binion to relocate to Nevada
where gambling was legal. He left much of his gambling operation in tact
despite the efforts of his major competitor Herbert Noble. There was a natural
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hostility between the Binion and Noble interest that resulted in periodic
violence. (Payne, 2000 and Dallas Morning News, Dallas Times Herald).
Someone made many attempts on the life of Noble. On one occasion a
sniper shot him. While he was in the hospital recovering from one of those
attempts, another shooter missed him. His car was repeatedly ambushed.  A car
bomb directed at Noble  killed his wife. Noble was finally blown to bits by a
bomb in August 1951.  His death ended the warfare (Dallas Morning News,
August 8, 1951).
When DA Henry Wade replaced Wilson, Wade continued the effort to
try to bring Binion back to Dallas to face gambling charges. His new case
charged Binion with evading federal income taxes from his share in policy      
( gambling) partnerships from which he allegedly received $30,252.00 in 1949.
He was also charged with state gambling violations. The grand jury was led by
businessman Jimmy Purse. Purse openly opposed Wade=s efforts. Purse was
overruled by the other members and died of a heart attack in Federal Judge T.
Whitfield Davidson=s courtroom while delivering the indictment. After
numerous appeals and maneuvering, Binion was returned to Texas three years
later. He received a five-year sentence for the federal charge and a four-years
for the state offense of running a policy wheel. He was incarcerated at Fort
Leavenworth for four years. Afterwards, he immediately returned to Las Vegas
where he was a popular figure and casino owner. At his death in 1989 he was
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eulogized by leaders at all levels of the State of Nevada, and the gaming
industry as a man  “of all seasons@ (Payne, 2000).
These are a mere sample of the gangland warfare, criminal activity and
generally colorful characters that gave Dallas headlines it did not want at a
time when the city was building a reputation for business growth. Slowly, the
idea for a crime commission began to develop among civic and business
leaders. The seeds of the idea were planted as early as 1946 when 31
businessmen met to discuss the creation of a Dallas County Crime
Commission. (A 1999 search of the Secretary of States filings revealed that
this group did not file for a corporate charter.)  The Dallas Morning News
reported in January, 1947,  about the difficulties of this first group. The article
tells the story of the failed first attempt led by Albert Sidney Johnson. It did
not succeed when the money could not be secured (Dallas Morning News,
December 20,1947).
The Frustrated but brief history 
of the Dallas County Crime Commission
  Dallas County Crime Commission members first met in November,
1946, to begin the process of organizing. Later in the month they planned to
meet again to discuss the source of financing. By this time they had created
by-laws and were discussing how to implement their ideas to work with all law
enforcement agencies for a A...fast impartial justice@. They wanted to improve
the efficiency of the criminal justice system and suggest changes to legislation.
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The group also hoped to make the public more aware of crime and its impact
and provide an oversight to the court=s system. After the initial meeting there
were between thirty and sixty-five members representing the incorporated
towns and cities of Dallas county, city trade, civic, educational and religious
groups and the press  (Dallas Morning News, January 11, 1947).
The Dallas Council of Social Agencies recommended that the
Community Chest (a forerunner of the United Way) fund the group for
$13,500.00. In December, 1946, the Community Chest refused to fund this
early commission despite demonstrated success of similar groups in Chicago
and Baltimore. Chief of Police Carl F. Hanson, Sheriff Steve Guthrie and
District Attorney Will Wilson all supported its creation. Guthrie said that a
commission can put the A...fear of God into those criminals. They=re more
scared of private citizens than of me or the District Attorney.@
Major General Albert Sidney Johnson was the chairman of the early
efforts at forming a commission and planned to meet with commission
members to decide how to raise the necessary funds. The Community Chest=s
rules required that the new agency raise its own funds for the first year. Both
the Community Chest and the Council of Social Agencies supported the
creation, of this crime commission, based on its listed purposes: 1. To promote
intelligent administration of criminal justice through co-operation with all
officials and agencies; 2. To investigate law enforcement and prepare
legislation to correct weaknesses in criminal procedure; 3. To keep complete
records of law enforcement including a central index of all felony cases; 4. To
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maintain a close watch over parole applications and 5. To keep the public
informed of social and criminal problems (Dallas Morning News, December
20,1947).
Major General Albert Sidney Johnson, who organized this first effort,
spent 35 years in the armed forces with 30 years in the Texas National Guard.
In 1958 his Aday@ job was as an investment banker with Rupe and Sons. (In
1999, Ray Montgomery remembered Johnson working at Rupe and that
Johnson was very active in civic affairs.)  He was not a physically large man,
5'8", 150 pounds. He was born in Paris, Tennessee and his parents named him
for the Confederate Civil War General under whom his grandfather had served
during the war. His father was allowed to give him his grandfather=s
commanders name because it A takes one generation to get over being mad at
the general.@ A.S.  enlisted in the Army in 1917 and was wounded in WWI in
Argonne. After the war and law school at the University of Texas he was
elected to the state legislature.  According to the 1956 Dallas City Directory he
was President of Rupe Investments at 820 Republic National Bank Building in
Dallas. Governor Price Daniel attended his retirement party from the National
Guard in 1958 ( Dallas Morning News, March 30, 1958)
The Dallas County Crime Commission Johnson tried to start  was
referred to as A...never active@ by 1949.  Johnson said that the original group
could never arrange the necessary funding needed to operate. District Attorney
Wilson indicated the need while praising the vigilance committee formed by
oilman Freeman Burford. Many hoped that the vigilance group would lead to a
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citizen=s  crime commission. It was generally believed that an open , non-secret
organization would be better than a secret one, such as Burford=s. 
Burford=s vigilance committee was formed after his and the home of
Harold Volk were rifled by thieves in University Park. Burford said his group
was backed by $50,000.00 from private citizens. He encouraged the Dallas
Citizen=s Council to start a crime commission. He wanted to disband his
vigilance committee. (Recall that until the 1930s, vigilance committees were
common throughout the U.S. Some continued or were formed in the 1950s.
There is no record that Burford=s group resorted to violence. It may have been
akin to a citizen=s patrol organization. Little information could be located about
this group.) (Dallas Morning News, October 10,1949). A new effort to form a
crime commission began shortly after the failure of the County Crime
Commission. 
The Dallas Crime 
Commission Begins
Initially, the new crime commission was to act in an advisory capacity
to the Citizen=s Traffic Commission, which had been active for years. But by
this time, 1949, there was a strong movement to resurrect the old organization,
now to be called the Citizens Crime Commission (it was incorporated as the
Dallas Crime Commission Inc.). It was again supported by the Council of
Social Agencies. Johnson agreed to lead the organization of the revived
commission (he would actually become the second president after Alphonso
Ragland.) 
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Membership in the new group would concentrate on A...outmoded
criminal procedure, overcrowded court dockets, misuse of paroles and  public
apathy toward the administration of criminal justice.@  The new commission
would include a representative of each incorporated city and town in Dallas
County, similar to the 1946 organization attempt by Johnson. It would include
a full-time director to be paid $20,000.00 per year (actual salary was
$10,000.00). The goals stated were similar to those of the failed county crime
commission. The new crime commission followed the standard established  by
Chicago and other national groups. There is no record that the commission had
help from outside Dallas. But,  it appears obvious from the organization used,
that Chicago assisted in forming the DCC.  Chicago Crime Commission
speakers were among the first speakers for the DCC, i.e. Guy Reed and Virgil
Peterson.
The Times Herald noted that the new commission would work toward a 
more efficient administration of criminal justice, would conduct necessary
investigations (emphasis added), they would keep records of law enforcement,
maintain close surveillance of parole applications, and they would keep the
public fully informed about criminal justice issues. In a June editorial the
Times Herald encouraged the formation of the group discussing the many
areas in the city that required more community involvement.  It  compared the
commission to the Traffic Commission which had been successful even though
all its recommendations had not been adopted.
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Discussion
By the 1950s, Dallas was on the verge of becoming a major business
force in the oil and gas and banking industry. It was demeaning and frustrating,
to city leaders, especially those in the Citizen=s Council, that Dallas was better
known for its crime than its aggressive business leadership.  Whether justified
or not, that was the perception of Dallas leadership. Newspaper stories from
the News and the Times-Herald reported the shootings and other outrages,
many on the front pages, and some that made national headlines.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1950, Dallas had 59
murders that year, 350 robberies, 626 aggravated assaults, 3,502 burglaries,
920 larcenies over $50.00 and 1,508 auto thefts. Nationally, violent crimes had
shown a significant increase only in negligent manslaughter. In Texas,
Houston reported 91 murders, 318 robberies but only 233 aggravated assaults. 
Texas urban areas reflected a crime index increase from 62,197 in 1949 to
70,936 in 1950. In fact, all of the index crimes increased in Texas except
aggravated assaults which had increased significantly in Dallas. If Dallas
citizens examined the crime reports they could see that even the city of Los
Angeles had only 63 murders reported and it was a much larger city , the
population of Dallas in 1950 was 434,462.  City leaders may have had a reason
to be concerned about Dallas= crime, they were certainly concerned about the
notorious headlines labeling their city as a violent one.
By 1952, the first full year of operation for the crime commission,
Dallas murders had increased to 62, robberies to 387, aggravated assaults to
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904, burglaries 4,111, larcenies 969 (over $50.00)and 8,494 (under $50.00),
and auto thefts to 2,468. Each representing a noticeable increase in two years.   
It is instructive to briefly examine Dallas’ crime prior to the 1950s. 
1930  was the first organized attempt to collate national crime statistics by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The  city of Dallas was
notable for the absence of crime reported to the national group. No felonious
homicides were disclosed, although there were no November reports. The city
reported 3 rapes, 47 robberies, 565 burglaries, 57 larcenies, 1800 auto thefts
(this figure seems high and may be inflated due to a reporting error as the first
years of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) were infamous for the cities
submitting inaccurate data).  A year later, 1931, Dallas reported 1 murder, 0
rapes, 64 robberies, 4 aggravated assaults, 203 burglaries, 94 larcenies over
$50.00, and 216 auto thefts. (Based on a review of the UCR submissions for
1931 it is apparent that the Dallas, December, 1931 report represented one
month=s data rather than the cumulative for the year.) Possibly someone did
not yet understand the UCR program. The year 1931 reported that Dallas
ranked above average in the number of crimes reported for cities over 100,000
but below that of two other crime commission cities,  Baltimore and Chicago.
By 1939, UCR crime statistics reported Dallas crime rate had begun to
increase with the population. The number of murders stood at 54, robbery 142,
aggravated assault 211, burglary 1798, larceny 168 and auto theft 530.  This
latter figure for auto theft suggests that the 1930 figure of 1800 auto thefts was
in error.
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This cursory examination of the two decades prior to formation of the
crime commission is indicative of some increase in crime over the period. It is
not sufficient to warrant great concern without other impetus, Eg. business
concerns and media reports of crime. The newspapers were reporting every
significant crime event, some warranting broad exposure in the media
(remember, very little television reporting in this era). There were several
shootings and bombings where someone tried to kill Noble, a Chicago group
attempted to bribe the new Dallas Sheriff and efforts to stop gambling had led
to notorious courtroom conflicts with Benny Binion. Emerging oil, gas,
banking and insurance business did not need this kind of publicity.
Citizen council members had the influence and funding to make a
strong statement to the world that outlaws would not be tolerated on  Dallas=
streets. Dallas population had grown from 260,475  in 1930 to 294,734  in
1940 and by 1950, post-war Dallas had a population of 434,462  . Dallas was
no longer a small North Texas community with rural leanings but a rapidly
developing urban city with wide racial, ethnic and economic separation. Many
of the new Dallas= citizens wanted to gamble, drink and have prostitutes and
drugs available. It was not necessary to tell city leaders that a strong visible
support for law enforcement was essential in removing the omni- appearance
of Dallas’ crime leadership. A crime commission would be formed in Dallas,
with their leadership.
The crime influence in Dallas led this group of business and
professional men to take action. Whether the reasons were consistent with
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crime theories was not a consideration. Today, it is significant to examine
whether crime commission programs support or conflict with current
premises.  Studies of these types of organizations are limited to examination
of the scope of citizen involvement in the criminal justice system. Police want
civilians to be willing to participate in the process; the question becomes one
of degree. Attempts have been made to define the degree of citizen
participation in criminal justice oversight organizations. 
One researcher attempts to describe the limits of public participation in
criminal justice policy since it is only with recent history that the government
has borne the brunt of policing (Grabosky, 1992). The past hundred years has
witnessed the government’s gradual assumption of that power bringing with it
the knowledge that law enforcement cannot perform their function without
help from the public.  Clearer delineations about citizen participation need to
be examined.
Private security, community crime prevention, community policing,
police auxiliaries provide established civilian roles in society.  Vigilantism is
not now acceptable and generally, police oversight committees have been
appropriate for modern law enforcement agencies. Citizen awards for
information about suspects, mediation of local disputes and victim assistance
are also reasonable for civilian participation. The research examined by
Grabosky reflects the changing landscape of private involvement in the
policing process.
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Conclusions expressed in this article are vague. Eg. It is fine for some
people to be encouraged to help law enforcement but not others. (Emphasis
added.) The author believes that some people who are simply Abusy bodies@
and are a detriment to law enforcement and should not be allowed to
participate. (Grabosky, 1992).
 Overall, he concludes that civilian participants in open or public crime
control groups are a welcome addition to improving law enforcement while
groups such as vigilance committees and Apolice informers@ represent the
repressive nature that can be attributed to some review groups.
It seems unlikely that law enforcement or courts or other functions of
the criminal justice community will select which citizens participate and which
are excluded. Open participation in oversight committees, or crime
commissions, necessarily allows anyone interested to participate. The history
of the GDCC suggest that there will occasionally be members  that have ideas
that conflict with the general population and may even cause some
embarrassment for the commission. Some others may have unique suggestions




The first meeting of the Dallas Crime Commission was reported on
February 3, 1951 when 30 citizens met in  a  room at the Southwestern Life
Building.  The 30 were made directors of the new commission. The new
president of the Dallas Crime Commission, Alfonso Ragland Jr, announced the
appointment of five permanent committee chairmen. James Aston was named
chairman of the membership committee, Rod Thomas, enforcement, Wilson
Crook, publicity, Hawkins Golden, legislative and Stephen J. Hay, juvenile
courts and activities.   Ragland said he and the Commission=s secretary Willard
Crotty had visited with the Dallas Sheriff, District Attorney and Chief of
Police to inform them that the committee did not plan to enforce the laws but
to give assistance to law enforcement agencies. J. Ralph Wood said the
commission endorsed the idea of another criminal court for Dallas and would
work toward that end.  The Citizen=s Council had  encouraged the Crime
Commission to apply for a charter of incorporation (Dallas Time Herald,
January 10,1950 and Dallas Morning News, February 2, 1951). The charter
was obtained and listed the original founders and members of the commission.
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 The offices of this first Dallas Crime Commission, Inc. were at 2022 Republic
Bank Building. Officers selected were  President-Alphonso Ragland Jr., ( the
Chairmen of the Board position was not designated until 1970.) The 1st Vice
President James Ralph Wood, 2nd Vice President, Carl J. Rutland,  Secretary-
Treasurer Willard Crotty, and the Managing Director was Daniel G. Reynolds.
DCC members were and are sought among citizens who will work toward
Commission goals. They were selected because they had influence within their
businesses and could make commitments without fear of reversal by their
hierarchies, many owned their own businesses. Often the DCC recruited the
top officials within the targeted organization. A sample recruitment letter from
this era was located in the Dallas Public Library Archives. It was to the U.S.
Postmaster for Dallas, who declined the membership due to the financial
commitment required by the DCC (Solicitation letter, August 21, 1951).
Others who did become involved included Willard Crotty who was
employed by Ellis Smith and Company. By 1977 he was with Fidelity Union
Insurance and listed as with Ellis Crotty Powers and Company. He was one of
the first Certified Property and Casualty Underwriters (CPCU) in Dallas.
James Aston was vice president of Republic National Bank. He was Dallas
City Manager before working at the bank. Wilson Crook was President of
Crook Advertising. Hawkins Golden worked at Leake, Henry Golden and
Burrow on Preston Road. He was an attorney. J. Ralph Wood Jr. was vice
president and Attorney with Southwestern Life on Ross Ave. Stephen J. Hay
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was president of Great National Life Insurance Company. Roderic B. Thomas
was vice president and treasurer of Rupe and Sons Inc. 
Alphonso Ragland headed a local insurance agency, now operated by
his son Cruger Ragland. Ragland was an enthusiastic hunter and skeet shooter
as was his wife. He graduated from the University of Texas and when killed in
1958 was the Vice President of the national group, Charter Property and
Casualty Underwriters. He was active with the Red Cross and had briefly
taught English. His son, Cruger, remembers his father quickly correcting
anyone=s grammar. Alphonso Ragland=s father had operated a trade school for
many years (Cruger Ragland interview, 1999).
Daniel G. Reynolds was named Managing Director of the Dallas Crime
Commission. He was at that time director of the Northwestern University
Traffic Institute, Evanston, Illinois. He planned to take over the Commission
on May 10 (he arrived on May 9). ADan@ was described as a husky , red-headed
49-year-old.  He was paid an annual salary of $10,000.00. Reynolds had also
been a member of the Miami, Florida police department for 16 years. Between
1941 and 1949 he was field representative and assistant director of field
services for the International Chiefs of Police (IACP).  He was a native New
Yorker and attended Northwestern University.  He traveled extensively
throughout the United States and was known as a teacher and lecturer in crime
related areas. He was quoted as saying about Dallas,  that he thought the
commission job offered an excellent opportunity to help Akeep a clean
community clean @. Once he arrived, however, he began to speak publicly
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about the criminal problems in Dallas (Crime Commission News,
January/February, 1952).
Reynold=s public approach was aggressive as reflected in his speeches.
He warned the Dallas public that the city was ripe for the entrance of
organized racketeers who had been uprooted by the Estes Kefauver (the U.S.
Senate crime committee chairman) investigation. He said his northeastern
associates believed Dallas was a place where shootings and bombings were
common, particularly at one fellow, referring to Noble. Reynolds said that
police in the Northeast believed, too, that Dallas let their Agangsters ride
around in Cadillacs and let them have bail right after they were arrested.@ He
hypothesized the main reasons for the increase in the crime rate was: 1.) An
inadequate prevention program, 2.) Failure of detection and apprehension. 3.)
Failure to prosecute adequately. 4.) Failure of courts or other agencies to deal
with the criminal after he was brought into court (Dallas Morning News, July
28, 1951).
Reynolds was also concerned about public apathy. He stressed the need
for public interest in crime control.  Public concern was needed to curb the
spiraling crime rate.  In one speech he cited the following crimes and court
proceedings occurring in Dallas and Park Cities on Friday in the previous






 Reynolds often expressed the problems, citing each of the core crime
commission concerns: a less than adequate court system, lack of support for the
police and a regular censure of the public=s apathy toward law enforcement. 
Like the managers and executive directors that followed him, Reynolds
began to push for new legislation.  His  program for the legislature included
parole/probation reform, bail bonds improvement, more courts, juvenile justice
improvement, narcotics trafficking laws,  and that better oversight was needed
for the licensing of beer/wine . He intended that the DCC cooperate with the
Dallas Bar Association (DBA) to effect needed changes. This cooperation
varied over the years. In recent years there has been a constructive relationship
between the DBA and the GDCC. 
 The January-February , 1952, ACrime Commission News@ (the first
commission newsletter)reported that the Managing Director, Reynolds, was
working toward Model Criminal Legislation for the 1953 legislative session.
He had consulted with the Sheriff, the District Attorney, local judges, the
Dallas Bar Association and the Southwest Legal Foundation. The Commission
was sponsoring a program with the Foundation to further the support for the
new legislation. 
The new commission had considerable influence and helped drive
popular support for programs to enforce (my emphasis) criminal justice laws.
This was reflected in 1951 when the state court inadvertently  placed the
wrong year on a convicted rapist=s file that allowed him to be released on a
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recommendation of pardon by the state Pardon Board. The rapist, one J.W.
Connally, had a file jacket that made it appear he had already served two years
of a five year term. There was public outrage at Connally=s pardon which was
exhibited in letters sent by Commission President Ragland.  His letter was
published in the newspaper. Governor Allan Shivers revoked the parole and
Connally was quickly returned to jail (Dallas Morning News, December
8,1951).
President Ragland had less success with gambler Benny Binion.
Eventually, he was brought back to Texas, but not before Nevada friends of
Binion caused Ragland some difficulties when he traveled there to offer
testimony. The DCC had been instrumental in the indictment and assisted in
bringing Binion to Dallas for trial. Ragland had a difficult time when he was
subpoenaed  to Nevada to testify for Binion=s removal. Ragland reported to the
commission that when he arrived in Las Vegas he was A harangued, harassed
and dragged to Las Vegas for four days by those who oppose law
enforcement@. There is little documentation of this incident but it can be
deduced that some Nevada authorities did what they could to block Binion=s
return to Texas (Crime Commission News, January/February, 1952).
Commission interest were broad in these formative years, much like
today. A primary focus, then and now was decreasing the use of narcotics. 
One of the first major community projects was the printing and distribution of
10,000 brochures describing the signs of narcotics use, particularly by
juveniles. Appendix B contains a sample anti-drug brochure of this era.
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The name of the organization was simply the Dallas Crime
Commission Inc. The first planned A annual @ meeting was at the Baker Hotel
on February 14, 1952. The speaker was Guy E. Reed  who was the Chairman
Emeritus of the Chicago Crime Commission. His speech was recorded and
broadcast over WFAA radio. There were 135 in attendance at this first public
Commission program(Crime Commission News, January-February, 1952).
In April, 1952 the DCC held another popular function in conjunction
with Southern Methodist University (S.M. U.). This meeting was for judges
and prosecutors to discuss organized crime. Senator Kefauver and Virgil
Peterson were speakers. Peterson later toured the Commission facilities and
met privately with Ragland and Reynolds. 
Other activities and programs for that early period included a campaign
to encourage people to pay their poll taxes. The DCC placed fifteen billboards
around the city urging citizens to pay. The poll tax  was a requirement to vote.
The billboards were paid for by The Packer Corporation of Texas, an outdoor
advertising company. 
DCC also presented three television shows. One was with
Representative Horace B. Houston Jr and Jack Nelson of Constructive
Citizens, one with Mrs. George Ripley and William A. Ware of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce and one show on poll taxes. 
They also mailed 600 copies of a  DCC promotional brochures and
2500 copies of the previously mentioned narcotics brochure. During this first
year, Managing Director Dan Reynolds A inspected @ three courts, two local
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and one federal. (The only record is a mention of this activity in the DCC
newsletter. )
ACrime Commission News@ for May/June, 1952 compared the local
crime rates with the national reports from the FBI.  This newsletter also
reported that President Ragland had met with the Fort Worth Crime
Commission to help with their organization.
The Dallas Crime Commission examined and supported several
initiatives to improve the Dallas criminal justice system, one that citizen=s take
for granted at the end of the twentieth century. The local courts announced that
they were about to be air conditioned so court could be held in the summer
months. The DCC also discussed and aided the issue raised by the Citizen=s
Traffic Commission, that the city needed more street lights and more police. 
Near the end of 1951 Ragland turned over the presidency of the
commission to Albert Sidney Johnson in a ceremony at the Hotel Adolphus
North Room. A new set of officers was elected, many who were in office
during the first presidency (Dallas Morning News, November 25, 1952).
In September of 1958, the DCCs first leader, Alphonso Ragland Jr.,55,
was killed in a head-on crash north of Denton. Logan Mayo remembered his
death in an interview in 1999. Mayo also recalled the trade school that Ragland
(actually his father) and his family operated. In fact, it was Ragland=s training
that helped Mayo get his first job at Sears. Ragland also ran an insurance
agency. Both Logan Mayo and Ray Montgomery had fond memories of Mr.
Ragland, remembering him as an enthusiastic and natural leader of any group.
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Also injured in the crash riding with Ragland were his wife, age 31, District
Judge and Mrs John A. Rawlins and A.K. Spalding. The party in the other car
was also killed in the accident.  Mrs. Ragland continues to remain under health
care as a result of the accident (Dallas Times Herald, September 16,1958 and
2000 interview of Cruger Ragland).
By 1953, membership in DCC stood at 90 individual, and 37 corporate
members. The issues discussed in 1954 involved Reynold=s concern that
racketeers from Oklahoma and Mississippi were moving their crimes to Dallas
and whether prison farms should be established in Dallas (Letter/memo to
members, April 19, 1954) The Commission would pursue the idea of prison
farms until the 1990s.  DCC was beginning what would be a long-term
discussion backing this idea. The leadership believed it would lead toward
rehabilitation of offenders and would help lower the county grocery bill by the
prisoners  work on the farms. This proposal was never implemented in Dallas.
It is one of only a handful of commission programs that was not adopted by
authorities.
DCC  embarked on a quiet program to establish some order in the
investigation of liquor licenses. This initiative is surprising today because a
non-governmental agency was able to decide who could or could not be
entrusted with a liquor license. None of the agencies responsible had the
manpower nor the time to effectively police the application process. Many
Dallas observers believed that the failure to control this process allowed
criminals to obtain liquor licenses. Others believed that liquor stores were
2 These records have not been maintained by the Commission for many years. There
is an assumption that at some point the records were destroyed.
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meeting places for the Acriminal element@. The commission Managing Director
Reynolds and  committeeman C. M. (Pat) Ashby met with the officials, created
a new form to include more background data and persuaded the county judge
to extend the time for the investigation to ten days. DCC had complete access
to Sheriff Decker=s files and soon had a very complete set of records on all the
operators and the licensed properties. It was maintained by commission office
Secretary Alice Gormley. 2 (Dallas Morning News, December 13, 1954)
Alice Gormley was the office secretary for the DCC. She would remain
so until the 1970s. She was later named the executive secretary. Mrs. Gormley
was closely associated with the DCC for many years and was instrumental in
its success (Dallas Morning News, September 3, 1958).
Reynolds and the commission used their influence to gain the public=s
interest in the fight against crime. In a speech to the Dallas Electric Club, at
the Baker Hotel, he pointed to the increasing murder rate in Dallas. At that
time he said Dallas was second only to Houston in leading the annual murder
rate for the United States. He believed the city needed more and better paid
policemen and the Texas criminal code needed revamping and modernizing. 
He wanted citizens to support the police and promoted the idea that the police
should have more precinct stations. Since Dallas only employed 700
policemen for 200 square miles, every time a policeman had to transport a
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prisoner to downtown, his beat was neglected for much too long. He believed
Dallas needed 1100-1200 policemen. 
Subsequently, Reynolds confirmed that Mississippi crime was involved
in crime in Dallas. He went to Mississippi and interviewed a suspect in jail
who confessed to several burglaries in Dallas. He returned to Dallas and gave
the report to DPD along with a tape of the confession. DPD followed up on the
report and cleared 11 Dallas burglaries and returned several subjects to Dallas
for trial. (There is no record that anyone in the history of the GDCC ever
played such an active role in an ongoing criminal investigation.)( Commission
letter, May 14, 1954)
Dan Reynolds also reported that recently two trucks from Dallas were
bombed in Kansas City and another bombed in San Antonio. It was believed to
be the result of a failed trucker=s strike.  On the positive side, the DCC had
worked with a local women=s group to establish the first city-county forensic
laboratory.(Commission Letter , February,14, 1955).
Reynolds wrote articles for local publication including two for the
Town North magazine. These articles AIs Texas A Magnet for Criminals@
published in August and September, 1953 encouraged more citizen
involvement in crime resistance and explained the criminal justice theories of
how the newer, more mobile and suburban society contributed to crime. It is
not known if Reynolds  was familiar with Emile Durkheim, anomie, Robert K.
Merton, or strain theories, but his article does assign criminal propensity to the
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rapidly changing landscape of the cities and the displacement of primary
controls. 
Juvenile crime was not ignored in these early years. Much like today,
the Commission knew that concentrated efforts toward youth would benefit the
community, in the future. The DCC sponsored a meeting and a survey of
Dallas County juvenile issues, it was believed to be the  first such survey since
1945. 
The issues and programs over the next few months included the very
active role of policing beer and wine applications. Eventually, this would grow
to approximately 100,000 records of applicants, their criminal records, and the
records reflecting police calls to the property. The DCC also sent observers to
a Tennessee prison farm to examine its feasibility for Dallas. John R. ABob@
Heston was hired as a full-time court observer. The practice of sending
someone to each court to physically observe the judges and their practices was
common among crime commissions. The watcher would note all significant
activities of the judge particularly if there were too many probation sentences,
failing to collect fines, too many short sentences or many others. See appendix
C for an example of the court observer’s survey.
 In December, 1954, the DCC urged citizens to aid them in the crime
fight. In a newspaper article it was noted that Alast week@ Dallas had five
murders which was more than some cities have in a year.  Throughout 1953,
Dallas recorded 80 homicides.
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In what, at first, appears to be a lighter side, the Comic Book
Committee was getting local merchants to agree not to sell Ablood curdling@
comic books. Members of this committee visited local drug stores to check the
vendors= wares. DCC believed that this type of reading was not appropriate for
juveniles. In the mid-1950s, television was still in its infancy and the choice of
movies ranged from westerns to romances with an occasional Ascary@ movie.
Thus, comic books were the most popular venue,  and one the DCC believed
deserved their attention. This committee faded from the records by the
1960s(Commission letter, November 4, 1954).
Earle  Cabell  was elected President of DCC in 1955 along with a new
slate of officers.   This election is significant because of the financial problems 
that beset the Commission. All of the officers elected with Cabell resigned
although some were reelected after the financial problems were resolved. The
directors had submitted their resignation after the failure of the Commission =s
financing. A new group was selected including a few of those that resigned.
The new Directors were H.H. AAndy@ Anderson, George Jalonick III, Albert
Sidney Johnson, Mike Davison, John McKee, William R. McDowell, T.N.
Sewell, W.E. Schoeneck  The irony of McKee=s election due to financial
shortfalls would be symbolic of his own downfall.
1956, marked the beginning of a problem that had killed the 1940s
effort in setting up the commission. There was no money to pay the salaries or
other operational expenses. On September 19, 1956 all the commissioners had
resigned in protest for the lack of funding promised by the Citizen=s Council.
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At the same time, Reynolds, the Managing Director, resigned to head the
National Safety Council=s traffic operations division in Chicago. Dallas
Citizen=s Council President D. A. Hulcy appointed himself, R. L. Thornton Sr.,
Stanley Marcus, Fred F. Florence, W. W. Overton, Jr., and Ben H. Wooten to
find the money needed to permanently fund the DCC on a sound basis. The
DCC required $50,000.00 for operations. Funding of the Commission became
a critical issue (Dallas Morning News, September 20,1956 and October 3,
1956).
In December, 1956, the Dallas County Grand Jury urged the
continuation of the crime commission because of the help that it provides
County Judge Lew Sterrett to Asort out@ beer/wine licenses. There was little
fanfare as the Citizen=s Council committee arranged the financial affairs to
reestablish the DCC. There is no record of a similar funding problem, certainly
of this magnitude, since this event.
Cabell congratulated the Dallas PD because prostitution was almost
non-existent in Dallas. That announcement, whether accurate or not, was the
highlight for the year.   The following year was climaxed with an attack by
Cabell on the parole process and the D.A.=s office. Cabell=s and Wade=s
conflict was played out in the newspapers for several months.  Included in this
was a demand for a revision of the laws allowing extensive delays in
prosecution after indictment, sentencing reform, reduction of paroles and
clemency declarations and treating more of the juveniles as adults. Cabell=s
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attack brought down the wrath of D.A. Henry Wade and most of the criminal
court judges; but it did produce pressure on area legislators to take action.  
  President Cabell took a personal hand in replacing the Managing
Director. Bryce Alexander, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel was his choice.
According to the Dallas Times Herald he had a background of legal training
and was an Army intelligence officer. He was selected in February of 1957. He
resigned effective October 1, 1958 to pursue other crime prevention positions.
(Dallas Morning News September 3, 1958).  This marked the beginning of
John Mckee=s reign as President of the DCC, it is not known whether this had
anything to do with Alexander=s resignation although it also marked the return
of Alice Gormley as the office secretary/administrator, when and how long she
had been out of the office could not be determined through interview or
records.
 Later in 1957, the DCC agreed to appoint a committee to study law
enforcement problems in connection with the pending integration of local
schools. By this date, the notoriety of the violence and use of force in other
cities had become national news. The study was requested by Jerome K.
Crossman.  Crossman , an attorney and developer, who was quoted in an the
newspaper stating that,  AWe don=t want the stigma attached to the city of Little
Rock associated with Dallas.@ He noted that similar studies had been made in
Louisville, Kentucky and Nashville, Tennessee, prior to those cities
integration. Earle Cabell, the outgoing president, said that Chief of Police Carl
Hansson was writing a special manual on the social change aspect of the
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A...pupil mixing@. When completed the manual would be distributed to law
agencies throughout the state. The idea of avoiding bad publicity for the city
was not exceptional. Earlier in the history of the DCC, Crossman had
publically noted that  in the very nature of the work, the Commission cannot
publicize “... its activities and that funds from the public are needed so that the
Commission can keep things from happening that might injure the city=s
reputation.@ It is suspected that he was referring to events such as the bad
publicity that accompanied violent resistence to integration of the public
schools in other cities( Crime Commission News , October 19, 1957).
The July, 1957 DCC newsletter also praised the DBA for reprimanding
fifteen lawyers for Arunning business@ in the jail. (Barratry?) It also discussed
the problem with pay for DPD officers who started with a base of $340.00 per
month after fifteen months. This contrasted with Ft. Worth officers only
having to wait for six months to reach base pay. The newsletter reported the
tally for beer/wine applications:  




These first few years of the DCC had realized some of its goals. It had
received, generally, favorable publicity. Partly because of the members
selected, and that they were appealing to a large group of the population, they
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were able to generate citizen interest in criminal matters. Certainly the appeal
was predominantly to the white population of Dallas. There were no records of
members from the Hispanic Oriental, or Black business community. From this
distance of nearly fifty years, it is not known if there were efforts to recruit
members from the minority community or if there were attempts from
minority population to join the DCC.  Popular exposure of DCC issues was
critical for its success. Programs initiated by the first leaders of the DCC
would remain important for years, some continue today.  A much broader
membership base is now represented because the leadership recognized that
criminal issues affect all layers of society. It was reflected even with the
proposal of Crossmen in 1957 asking for peaceful integration. 
Commission projects addressing juvenile and narcotics= problems
continued as the new president took over. Each year DCC administrators
recognized the importance of encouraging juveniles to stay in school, to avoid
drugs and alcohol. Other issues, such as pushing for a county prison farm
faded as criminal justice needs changed over the decades.  Commission
members carried on with the mission of citizens= crime programs. Leadership
changed the focus and visibility of the DCC,  but rarely affected its overall
objective. During the next fourteen years the trend would continue with a new
leader at the helm who would eventually test the fortitude of the members.
Discussion
The commission had by now begun to recognize some of the influence
it could exert within the criminal justice system. It was campaigning for new
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laws at the state level, sending out brochures to help give advice on drug
problems, sending speakers to civic groups to arouse public interest and  to the
media about court problems from probation to the types of cases the district
attorney should be prosecuting. At this point, they were very influential in
authorizing new alcohol licenses throughout the city. They would spend nearly
fifty years attempting to get the county to build prison farms, unsuccessfully.
Dallas Crime Commission members generally supported most expansions of
jail facilities and had already assisted in the creation of a new court.  As their
history evolves they would concentrate on helping increase the size of and
number of state and local prison facilities.  
There is a continuing debate among professionals whether more prisons
is a positive issue for reducing crime. One author addresses a portion of the
prison expansion problem; the perception by Americans that we must keep
building more and larger prisons to Acontrol crime@. One of his concerns is the
great amount of funds used to maintain this self-fulfilling bureaucracy. He
believes the criminal justice agencies highlight the threats of crime rather than
the reductions in crime  (Chambliss,1999).
This book, Power, Politics, and Crime, further describes how the
statistics reported to justice agencies is often augmented by the methods used
in poor areas with high crime rates. After observing the techniques used in the
Washington, D. C. ghetto, the author concludes that more aggressive
enforcement styles cause the statistics in poor neighborhoods to be higher than
that in middle class areas of the city. The author further points to the huge
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prison and police enhancements due to drug investigations. He believes this
primarily focuses on minorities and the poor, swelling their numbers in the
prison population without significantly reducing crime.
Community standards and labeling are the subsequent areas of the
author=s interest. Often Americans label certain young people because of their
middle-class background. These young people are involved in the same minor
crimes as others but because of their environment, their crimes are Alabeled@ as
Ayouthful indiscretions@. Other juveniles from poorer circumstances or ethnic
and racial differences are labeled as delinquents who need to go to jail, despite
committing the same crimes as the first group. Chambliss believes these marks
tend to stay with the young people into adulthood and often lead to adult
criminal conduct. He believes that better education of these youths would
diminish these differences. 
Chambliss= book Power , Politics and Crime is somewhat opinionated
in tone but with substantial annotation and documented research. His
conclusions are well-founded despite a less than academic process. Often, he
makes dogmatic statements about agencies that he accuses of single-
mindedness. The fact that he proposes many changes that other criminal justice
professionals support is mitigated by his opinions. Most agree that the prisons
are too full of too many citizens and that poor people have a disadvantage in
the criminal justice system. He points too to the plethora of prisoners  being
held on minor drug charges. These are the types of things that crime
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commissions need to know to further educate the public and adjust their policies.
Chambliss= book could be a guidebook for crime commission policy
and programs. Particularly, now that many political leaders are publically
calling for ways to reduce our dependence on prisons for crime control.
Commission legislative programs and their community support programs
could provide an impetus to changes in government policy. Most of the
changes suggested by Chambliss are not those that can be directed by police
but must be promulgated by private citizens. There is no organized group of
citizens, in this arena, more effective than the crime commissions. 
In The Politics of Prison Expansion the author focuses on the state’s
governors as major instruments in the enlargement of the prison population. A
portion of his research analyzes some Marxist theorists’ suggestion that as
society progresses, a larger portion of the population will become prisoners.
Their idea is that the community will use the criminal justice system to control
thinking, not crime. Other theorists suggest a more racially biased theory to
explain prison expansion. Social control theorists believe that prisons would
expand as crime rates increased. None of these theories were accepted by
Davey, the author, and according to him, failed to explain the large increase in
prison growth. Only the election of “law and order” governors explained the
increases (Davey, 1998).
Davey examines prison expansion and crime rates between
1972-1992. Increases and decreases are correlated with the election of
governors. Literature is examined to provide guidance and evaluation of the
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theories.  He attempts to apply known ideas about prison expansion. The
conclusions reflect that the most common denominator is the election of law
and order governors.
This leads to the author’s concentration on the state governors. He
believes that the governors who established reputations as law and order
politicians, did so by increasing their respective prison populations. It is an
easy , if expensive, apparent solution to crime.  Higher and higher prison
populations provide an immediate answer to crime fears despite evidence that
the released prisoners pose a greater threat to citizens because of his
“education” in prison. This is most evident when American  imprisonment
rates are compared with those of most industrialized nations. The differences
lie in drug and homicide imprisonment where the U.S. has a far greater
concentration than other countries. 
His final conclusions are not surprising: politics play a greater role in
prison expansion than crime or even the crime theories. It is of value when
examining crime commission efforts since they traditionally have encouraged
prison and jail growth. I doubt that any crime commission would appreciate
this author’s belief that by following this trend they were playing into the
hands of Marxists and other theorists that the continued inflation of prisons is
an American version of economic and social citizen control. Davey does
provide useful data to help crime commissions decide on political proposals.
They would do well to begin examining a gradual reduction of relying on
prison enhancements and study methods of crime prevention. Davey also
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focuses on the poor quality of training, counseling and education provided to
prisoners.  Any efforts to improve the status of prisoners, once released, could
reduce the likelihood of his resorting to crime. Any combination of these
proposals would be good projects for the crime commission. 
Each of these authors offers substantial guidance to the crime
commission.  Certainly, the GDCC has often favored and helped gain
legislation to increase the number of Texas prisons. Many of the commission
members have made public, their concern, for both rehabilitation of first-time
offenders and their support for programs to diminish the causes of crime in
communities. The Commission’s political influence would certainly be a
powerful factor with future and current political leaders , such as the state
governor.
 Throughout its history, GDCC has tried to lead the community in
directions that would ease the public concern toward crime and keep
dangerous criminals away from the community. It may be that the Commission
tried to do too much without concentrating on issues that would produce the
most long-term benefit to Dallas.
3  McKee=s influence was enhanced by his leadership in the Masons. This aspect has been explored in
prior articles about his downfall. This will not be addressed in this writing.
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 Chapter Three
 McKee’s Era 
 
On October 25, 1957, John McKee became the new President of the
DCC; he would remain President until 1972 when he was forced from office
under a cloud of suspicion. He came to the Commission as an executive with
the Ford Motor Company. The DCC, under Ragland, Johnson and Cabell , had
made some public acclaim, under McKee they would be a more visible force.
McKee became the symbol of  the authority of the DCC, with the influence to
effect most changes that he selected for the Commission. 3   He was often
quoted as saying  AWe think the public has a  right to know what its officials
are doing@, referring to the Commission=s role as a civilian observer over the
criminal justice system.   He involved the Commission in many controversial
issues, some that drew criticism from public officials. He usually responded to
such criticism by pointing to the fact that A.....we are not elected, we are not
paid and we answer to nobody@ or that there are no A...sacred cows@ (Dallas
Times Herald, December 19,1968). His end would dramatically illustrate this
belief.
McKee=s first full year,1958, was filled with mixed accomplishments
and censures. It began with his criticism of the leniency accorded Driving
While Intoxicated ( DWI) offenders by the courts. It ended with the Dallas Bar
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Association (DBA) criticizing the DCC for wanting harsher punishment for
juveniles. The latter disapproval was directed toward the Commissions=
program to give juries the benefit of a juveniles= criminal record for sentencing
consideration. The Commission was opposed by Bob Stinson president of the
DBA. He and McKee were often cited in the newspapers on opposing sides of
this and other issues.
Interestingly, McKee=s 1958 annual report reflected on an issue that
would extend to the present day.  He wrote about the need for strengthening
the bail bonds and the bail bond law. McKee noted that of 417 persons charged
with multiple offenses, many of the crimes committed occurred  while the
defendant was on bond for a first offense.
McKee included juvenile criminal problems in this area, stating that
there were 36 agencies or organizations who studied juvenile issues. These
public and private groups often pressured the justice agencies and judges to be
lenient with the underage arrestees. 
In October, 1959, the DCC hired a national auditing firm to determine
whether the Dallas County Commissioners= Court was using its funds properly.
This became a cause celebre and occupied both local newspapers for months. 
Another major effort of the Commission was to improve collections on bond
forfeitures. The problem of bails and bail bonding was, and is, a pervasive and
a difficult issue. There were never enough deputies to keep up with
outstanding warrants and judgements. Commission examination was focused
toward their concern that county funds that were not being collected and
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judges allowing arrestees out to commit other crime (Dallas Times Herald,
October 27,1959).  Bail and bail bonds became a different sort of issue when a
portion of the Crime Stopper funds came from these payments in the 1980s.
 Ft. Worth and Dallas Crime Commissions received national attention
in November, 1959 when their combined resources hosted the National
Association of Citizen=s Crime Commission (NACCC) annual assembly. It
drew hundreds of crime commission representatives from around the United
States. Their program addressed each cities specific problems but primarily
focused on racketeers and drug activity.
1959 marked an effort to combine the crime commissions of Dallas and
Ft. Worth. Commission President John McKee named Jerome Crossman, C.
M. Ashby, Willard Crotty and W. E. McAnally  to work with a similar group
from Ft. Worth. He announced this proposal at the annual meeting of the DCC
where McKee was reelected to a second one-year term. Subsequent minutes, or
other records, fail to reflect why this effort was not successful ( Dallas Times
Herald, May 24, 1960).
McKee  continued to push for consolidation of the Fort Worth and
Dallas crime commissions. Each of the commissions continue  today as
separate entities although they do periodically co-sponsor projects ( Interview
with former Executive Director Nickie Murchison , 1999).
 McKee added some heat to the controversy over DWI by pushing for a
requirement that offenders be required to provide a blood test. He asked for
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legislation that would  give the arresting officer authority to seize the
offender=s driver=s license (Dallas Times Herald, October 27,1959).
McKee=s annual report  established that the DCC would operate in the
future under several permanent committees. The Board of Directors set ten of
the committees: 1. Courts and District Attorney, 2. Crime Prevention, 3.
Educational, 4. Finance, 5. Juvenile, 6. Legislative, 7. Liquor Control Board, 8.
Police, 9. Probation and Parole, 10. Sheriff=s, with two sub-committees for bail
bonds and prison farm analysis. (DCC notes, 1958).    Many of these, under
different labels, operate today. The use of committees to investigate , study
and  support DCC programs was, and is, a mainstay of the Commission
although the Dallas Crime Commission stopped conducting investigations in
1972.
DCC’s examination of the bail bond problems reached its peak in 1959,
when the committee called for a meeting to discuss this never-ending
quandary. The Commission’s influence was reflected by those who attended,
included were all the Criminal District and County Criminal Judges, the
District Attorney and other officials A...who would be concerned@.  This
gathering illustrates the appeal and respect that the DCC held, only nine years
after formation. Forfeitures improved, briefly after the meeting, but collections
continued to be too slow (DCC letter, June 21,1960).
The rapid increase in crime in Dallas became a big issue in 1960.
According to FBI statistics Dallas and Houston were leading Texas in
increased crime. Dallas led Houston in many categories.
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 The FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1960 reflects the greater Dallas
area had a crime rate of 1,270.2 crimes per 100,000 people. This included 98
murders, 63 rapes, 566 robberies, 1,085 aggravated assaults, 5,998 burglaries,
2,283 larcenies over $50.00 and 2,322 auto thefts. These crimes occurred in a
population of 1,083,601.  Crimes in the region had increased dramatically
since 1959. Murders were up over 21 percent and robberies and burglaries had
increased 22 and 28 percent respectively. All of the index crimes  revealed
significant increases. 
 By far, 1960's greatest notoriety was the DCC=s continuing
investigation of the County Commissioners. There were allegations that some
or all of the commissioners were using county property and funds for private
gain. The DCC hired two people, an engineer, and a former FBI agent, to
conduct the investigation. County auditor Moore Lynn said the county had lost
$125,000.00 from the private use of asphalt paving and gravel hauling and the
renting of county equipment to private entities. Whether or not the funds had
been repaid to county coffers was one of the questions for the investigation.
The  notoriety was compounded when County Judge Lew Sterrett
disclosed he had revealed the information that led to the DCC investigation of
County Commissioner Bill Coyle.  Sterrett said he asked the DCC to
investigate all the commissioners, including himself, to ensure fairness. There
were charges that the investigation was timed to influence the upcoming
election. Notoriety about the investigation was reflected in the local
newspapers. 
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The DCC=s audit of the Commissioner=s Court was continuing in June,
1960 along with headlines of accusations and counter-accusations.  The
preliminary results had been furnished to the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury
apparently felt justified in making an unusually public statement indicating 
they believed the acts disclosed did not constitute A criminal acts@.  The Grand
Jury viewed the actions of the county commissioners as improper but not
illegal. Their failure to indict led to an editorial response from the Dallas
Morning News very disparaging of the grand jury ( Dallas Morning News ,
June 2, 1960 ).
This incident with the Commissioner=s Court was fairly typical of DCC
actions under John McKee. He did bring the crime commission into the public
eye and was not fearful of challenging the status quo. It also reflected the
breadth of his influence. All of the propositions pressed by McKee were the
result of close cooperation with the members of the Commission. These were
men who ran their own business, were in top management of banks, insurance
companies and law enforcement. They were not A yes@ men but had their own
ideas about crime and citizen roles.   His fourteen years in the President=s chair
of the DCC was marked with many other incidents and proposals for
legislative changes, local court procedural modifications and programs for
better citizen involvement. Despite his ending, many of these ideas were far-
reaching and even ahead of their time.
It was during this period that McKee told the story of his upbringing in
Harrisburg, Pa, when at age 12 his mother, father, two brothers and a sister
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died of influenza. His mostly fictional account would eventually cause his
downfall. According to McKee, the death of his family occurred in  1919. He
was forced to live for one and one/half years with an aunt until her death. He
told the story that afterwards he moved to New York, attending New York
University. He managed to work his way through school, receiving a Bachelor
of Science degree in 1929. Much of this story later proved to be less than
accurate. This information would provide fodder to derail McKee=s career in a
few short years. 
Meanwhile, the proposal, fought by the DBA, that the defendant=s
criminal record could be given to the jury for sentence assessment was being
promulgated by  McKee as the ACalifornia@ law since it was already in practice
there. Today, juries may be given a defendant=s prior record to assist in setting
punishment. In the federal system the jury does not assess punishment, that is
done by the judge and he/she may consider prior criminal history in
establishing the sentence. McKee continued to push for more punitive
treatment of DWI offenders. He had proposed, in 1958, that upon the first
offense the defendant should be forced to take a blood test, have his car
impounded and he should pay a cash bond of $1000.00. Conviction at the first
offense would warrant seventy-two (72) hours in jail and loss of  license for
six months. If there was a second offense the defendant would receive an
automatic one year in jail (Annual Report, 1960).
McKee was an early proponent of trying sixteen year-old juveniles as
adults and raising the maximum sentence for murder without malice from two
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to five years to five to twenty-five years. He wanted the judge to have
discretion on whether or not to hold separate trials when there was more than
one defendant. The judge, would also decide whether one defendant would be
allowed to testify against the other. He wanted to examine the reason the grand
jury, there was only one grand jury in 1960, returned so many no-bills.  McKee
continued to examine methods to improve weak bail bond laws (Crime
Commission Annual Report, 1960).
Another well-publicized 1960 proposal from McKee, and the DCC,
was a recommendation that permits should be required for gun ownership and
that the police department approve each purchase of guns. This proposal
received wide-spread publicity. The DCC led a strong effort to gain legislative
support for this idea. McKee said the law would A...propose regulatory controls
on the purchase of firearms by first requiring a permit@. The permit would
require  police screening of purchasers. Police Chief Jesse E. Curry supported
the legislation along with  the Ft. Worth and Houston Crime Commissions.
They all were concerned about too many A...teen-age hoodlums@  arming
themselves too easily. Chief Curry was quoted as saying that as many as a
hundred shootings could have been avoided if firearms had not been so easily
available  (Dallas Morning News, November 13, 1960). This approach to gun
purchases did not gain popularity during McKee=s life, it would only partly be
implemented in Texas in the 1990s.
McKee  proposed an area survey to determine how many police should
be in Dallas based on the size of the area patrolled rather than the population,
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this was previously suggested by the first Managing Director Dan Reynolds.
McKee would continue to ask the commissioners= court to study whether a
prison farm for Dallas County would be a useful addition to the criminal
justice system. This idea would be suggested each year into the 1990s.
Nineteen sixty-one (1961) was a quieter year, partly because the overall
crime index rates were down.  McKee wrote that he believed that juvenile
crimes were being handled better which helped with the crime reduction. He
was pleased too,  that DPD had recently added another 50 officers but argued
more were needed for a positive force against crime in the city. The DCC was
continuing to press for another court and were concerned too, that the County
Grand Jury had publically criticized the District Attorney=s Office for spending
too much time as a bill collector  for merchants= bad checks. The Grand Jury
believed that local businesses should take more responsibility for avoiding
check losses. This coincided with DCC programs. 
By 1962 major crime was up 11% with Dallas ranked 5th for murders
nationally. McKee blamed part of the problem on the lack of sufficient courts
to try cases.  At the same time he commended DA Wade for impaneling a
second grand jury. He chose the  1962 Annual Report to criticize the state
Bar=s efforts to pass changes in the Criminal Code and urged its rejection. It
would be passed by the state legislature but due to protest from the DCC and
the state=s district attorneys, would be vetoed by the governor (Annual Report,
1962).
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 There was concern too, about narcotics and gaming cases and the
constant delays in prosecution. There had been a 33 1/2% increase in major
crimes since 1959, even though there had only been an increase in population
of 2.5%. Other areas examined by the DCC were  private club complaints.
Most of Dallas County did not allow the sale of liquor, to have drinking
privileges, private clubs were licensed. Most complaints were about the
unlicenced clubs since there were only 126 licensed and 150 unlicenced ones
(Annual Report, 1962).
The DPD was still running about 100 officers short of its authorized
manpower complement. A major reason for this was the complaint about
police pay, base pay was $317 per month take home. McKee said the city
needed to abandon old civil service wages. Constant turnover of officers was
costing the city due to the need for training of new policemen. If this were
allowed to continue, the population should not be surprised at corruption.
McKee said, more than once, that the residents get what they pay for, and
salaries must be raised to improve motivation and insure continued integrity.
In 1964, the DCC was trying to obtain raises for the District Attorney
and his staff (they were successful in 1965), at that time DA Henry Wade was
handling both jobs of County and District Attorney for a salary of $16,000.00. 
McKee began to more publically criticize churches and homes for
failing to provide moral leadership to stem the tide of rising crime. He noted
that the prison population was growing three times faster than the city’s
59
population, emphasis added. There is, he said, too much attention to material
goods. He would continue this theme throughout his administration.
He led the DCC into providing literature to school libraries to aid
students to understand police responsibilities. It was important for children to
recognize policemen as their friend and not an enemy. The brochure in
appendix D  was typical of this type of commission document.
The budget for 1964 was $20,814.15 with $2,493.00 designated for
investigations. In the annual report, he listed himself as the President and
Managing Director for the first time since Bryce Alexander had resigned in
1958 (Annual Report, 1964).
 In a letter to a private citizen, dated March 11,1964,  and signed by
McKee, he discussed the DCC=s role in the city. The letter was an apparent
response to a request from the citizen. In the letter, McKee notes that the DCC
maintains about 100,000 record cards on criminals regarding their offenses and
the disposition of those offenses. This information is furnished to the
commission by state and federal agencies and courts. He stated that citizens
could call the commission and obtain all the information that is maintained on
a job prospect or any other legitimate reason for needing the background
information. (Note that this is nearly ten years before the first freedom of
information and privacy act legislation which limited the release of law
enforcement records ).
 McKee said in the letter, that the DCC had studied a Detroit juvenile policy
that helped keep young people from receiving a juvenile criminal record. Previously,
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if a juvenile was picked up by police, he or she was charged with Asuspicion @ which
was placed on their permanent record. As a result of the study, DCC had suggested
that the Dallas PD change its policy.  The Commission had encouraged the police to
take the juvenile home and avoid having a stain on the youth=s file. DPD adopted the
procedure. Generally, this policy continues today.
In 1965, McKee and the DCC launched another investigation into an alleged
abuse of probation  by the defense attorneys and the courts. The DCC asserted that
many offenders were being given multiple probated sentences, allowing violent
persons to walk the streets. The Commission wanted more of the arrestees given
more jail time and fewer probated sentences.  The Grand Jury publically criticized
the report for inadequate information. They said the errors allowing what appeared to
be more probated sentences, were usually caused by clerical blunders. The DBA had
also criticized the report but they and the DCC subsequently agreed to work together
to improve the efficiency of the probation department. 
The remaining years of John McKee=s leadership of the DCC were colorful.
Historically improved vision reveals a McKee continuing to spiral toward a more
hyper-critical, dogmatic leadership style. There were bursts of ideas with beneficial
suggestions mixed with more that were confusing. He routinely was quoted and
wrote diatribes about society or of particular individuals and he periodically
criticized the DPD, the Sheriff=s Office or the District Attorney. 
McKee appeared before the Grand Jury, in 1965, to explain his public
criticisms of the operation of the DPD. The Grand Jury adopted his
recommendations that included a 24 hour operation of the Identification Bureau,
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improvement of the writing of police reports and more pre-sentence conferences
between the judges and prosecutors. These reasonable suggestions were followed by
others that are confusing.
McKee criticized the on-going civil rights sit-ins and demonstrations as
another example of the Amoral decay@ of the country. The demonstrations, in his
view,  reflected  disloyalty to the country. One unexplained proposal was that the
police and the criminal justice system should stop wasting time on cases that the
grand jury will Ano bill@. (If it is not investigated, how will the information be
collected to provide to the grand jury?)
The DCC continued to promote positive ideas for children. They distributed
100,000 pamphlets for school children AAlways be Careful@ which outlined ways for
children to avoid becoming victims of crime and taught them to trust policemen.
Brochures and visits to schools by policemen and members of the Commission
reinforced the positive message to school children.
He complained often about slanderous statements and charges made against
his operation of the Commission but stated he would continue to recommend
methods of crime prevention.  McKee asked for a $5000.00 increase in budget for
the next year for additional studies and investigations. The total was $24,324.87 with
$2500.00 for investigation, educational and crime prevention program
By 1966, McKee=s annual reports were more strident, his annual report was
somewhat rambling for 33 pages. Much of it written in a sermonizing fashion
discussing all the people who were critical of his efforts to improve the criminal
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justice system. He continued to blame most of the problems on church, family and
school leadership.
Positive programs implemented during the later years included a change of
the Public Forum to  AOperation Concern@. This was a  program for 7-12 graders
called AOperation On Guard@ to provide instruction to help children recognize sex
offenders and pornographers. They were taught self-defense tactics by the DPD. The
Chairman of the Juvenile Committee, Harry Kaplan, developed a program to reduce
juvenile crime through speeches to juvenile and adult groups in communities.
On the crime front, the DCC worked with law enforcement authorities
through a commission informant and successfully prosecuted a forgery/prostitution
ring. L.W. ALogan@ Mayo Chairman of the Liquor Board Committee attended
weekly protest meetings in Judge Sterrett=s Court. These occurred when the DCC
sent letter reports to the Judge=s office, police, and Texas Liquor Control Board with
the results of their records= search reflecting unfavorably on the applicant. If the
prospective licensee opposed the denial, there was a hearing in the County Judge=s
Court. 
By 1967 McKee=s ideas for solving crime were more focused on major
sociological issues. In a letter to a citizen he complained about the growing tendency
to blame society for criminal acts. He cited sociological studies from England that
suggested that it was the failure of environmental changes that might lower crime
rates. His interpretation of the study was that better living conditions for criminals
simply meant they were more comfortable while committing criminal acts.
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 McKee also blamed the church, for failing to provide moral leadership, the
schools, for not instilling respect for the law, and parents, for not providing guidance
for their children. In the same letter he did have specific recommendations.  One was
to create more reasons to attract policemen to law enforcement service (Annual
Report, 1966).
In the last few years of his presidency  McKee often made public statements
that offended many Dallas leaders. These occurred when officials were not consulted
prior to a media announcement from the Commission . An example occurred in 1968
when the DCC paid for a full page advertisement in each of the local newspapers,
asking the schools what they were doing about the lack of school and police efforts
to rid schools of drugs and prostitution. The DCC had hired an ex-FBI agent to
investigate prostitution which had led him to uncover significant high school
prostitution and drug activity. No one had been advised of the investigation prior to
the newspaper ad. The report of teenage drug addiction and prostitution was widely
publicized in Dallas. McKee  suggested that there could be payoffs from the call-girl
trade to persons from the local criminal justice agencies. A copy of the investigative
report was not in the archives of the DCC to review (Dallas Times Herald, December
15, 1968). 
McKee and the Commission launched a more popular program to bring more
citizens into anti-crime efforts. The DCC proposed a petition to present to legislators
and President Johnson to enact laws to protect and preserve the rights of individual
citizens. They also wanted to recruit citizens into an Aarmy@ against the criminals.
4    Former council woman Sybil Hamilton who first publically called for McKee to resign died of 
cancer in 2000 aged 79. She was known to be very outspoken, forceful and with great compassion.  In
addition to her city council service she was also appointed to the EPA governing board by President
Nixon. 
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The DCC appealed for help from churches, schools, and parents. The Herald
editorial said this was the only way meaningful law enforcement could be achieved,
through citizen action. A petition was organized, whether a letter was ever sent to the
White House, could not be confirmed.
There was a direct conflict with the DBA and DCC over public coverage of
trials. According to the DCC press statement, the ABA had issued a report that
would attempt to reduce press coverage of trials and thus Amuzzle@ the press. The
Dallas Criminal Bar Association urged the  DCC to quit harassing effective law
enforcement and get off  its Avirtuous high horse@. This public confrontation
continued in the local newspapers until the ABA proposal was rejected by the
legislature. 
 A local reporter used the incident to discuss the history of the DCC and
particularly McKee=s ten years at the helm of the organization. The reporter pointed
to the general perception that many local officials either despised or revered the
DCC. Local police vice officers thought that McKee was Athe man who cries wolf.@
City Councilwoman Sibyl Hamilton asked for McKee=s resignation but he
announced that he would accept another 3-year term.4 The city council and school
officials were critical that McKee announced the school drug and prostitution
report before he discussed it with them.  Hamilton said that McKee wants to
pinpoint problems and make headlines but wants no part of the solution. One
65
particular aspect of the report was that McKee said that 70% of the school
principals were not interested in his information about the use of drugs in the
schools. When asked for proof, in a style reminiscent of Joseph McCarthy,  McKee
said A Do you think I=d make a report that can=t be backed up? Now you=re
questioning my integrity!@ (Dallas Morning News, December 17, 1968).
McKee was adamant that organized crime was in Dallas often pointing to
100 fronts for gambling in the city. McKee said that if something is not done about
it, legitimate businesses will start losing money from them, emphasis added.
He was angry about  DPD=s problem with the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) and the Black Panther Party (Black Panthers). This refers to the
instances when major police departments throughout the United States were sued
civilly by groups who suspected that law enforcement had illegally investigated
their organization. He believed this indicated these groups disloyalty to the country
(Annual Report, 1969-70).
 The DCC began working with the police department on the A Crime Stop
Program@. This was a plan to educate citizens about suspicious activity and to help
them work more closely with the department. It was often referred to as a crime
stopper program but did in fact work toward involving citizens in simple crime
prevention efforts such as locking their houses and cars and watching for
suspicious people in their neighborhood.
Nineteen hundred seventy (1970) found the DCC attempting to gain an
additional 400 policemen for DPD and to stop the cycle of repeat offenders.  This
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continued in the 1970-71 Annual Report which McKee submitted as a speech at the
Annual Membership Meeting November 29, in the Junior Ballroom of Statler-
Hilton. He recommended that  police training be improved  and that the base pay
for policemen increase. Also, in a somewhat prophetic quote he said, AThe year of
1972 is just around the corner and if there aren=t (sic) some drastic changes made in
our community, we are predicting that the crime rate will increase.@ He certainly
was not expecting the A drastic changes@ to be solely directed at him and to end his
domination of the GDCC and his influence in Dallas. 1970 also marked the name
change of the DCC to the Greater Dallas Crime Commission indicating the
beginning of the commission=s expansion outside of downtown Dallas.
The reporter that initially broke the story about McKee’s fallacious conduct
was Hugh Aynsworth of Newsweek, now of the Washington Times. His story
detailed how McKee, believing he was near death, called a friend  to his bedside.
The friend was an Episcopal priest. During this encounter, lasting several days
McKee revealed his true identity and some of his crimes. McKee recovered and
then sought to have the priest driven out of the Masonic Order on moral=s charges.
The priest contacted an attorney and the press. 
ADeposed McKee was city=s Mr. Clean for more than decade@ read the
headline.  After years of being the leading crime fighter in Dallas, McKee was
discovered to be using an assumed name, James Kell Zullinger, who was a military
deserter in 1929. He was also charged with embezzlement from the Scotish Rite
organization. At the time of his downfall he was one of the highest ranking officials
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in the state=s Masonic Order. He would eventually receive a seven year probated
sentence for his crime.  The Masonic Order eventually sued him to collect the
embezzled funds. An interesting side note is that McKee=s military desertion was
mute by 1972 since the Navy had declared Zollinger, his true identity, legally dead
in 1951. Had it not been for the embezzlement, and his charges against the priest, he
could have continued his career posing as McKee. (The expanded story of this
remarkable event, including Aynesworth documenting a visit of AMcKee@ to his
dead relatives, is recorded in his story written for  D Magazine, August, 1983). 
The Dallas Morning News ran a lengthy column detailing the follow-up
immediately after the McKee scandal became public. R. L. Thornton, Jr. and other
board members were quoted saying that the DCC might become even stronger now
that it was not a one man organization. At the time of the story McKee had not
resigned from the commission but the DCC had been suspended from the National
Association of Citizens Crime Commissions.  The DCC staff consisted of an office
manager, bookkeeper, and two stenographers.  There were some suggestions that
the DCC might not survive the McKee scandal partly because his public
pronouncements had angered many city leaders. According to Ray Montgomery and
Logan Mayo interviews in 1999, this was a serious concern. The records and
Montgomery, who played a significant role in the Commission=s revival, reflect that
Mayo and Thornton were prime movers in the restoration of the GDCC as a force in
Dallas.
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Reorganization of the GDCC began almost immediately with the arrival of
advisors from the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to recommend
changes. A 5-man committee of the Dallas Citizen=s Council was assigned to work
on organizational changes. This committee included Leo Corrigan Jr., Al Davies,
Ben Lipshy, H.D. Schodde and Bill Seay. Representatives from other successful
commissions  also visited and conferred on operations. Interestingly, in two years,
other cities would be inviting Mayo to speak to them about improving their Crime
Commission and he would be elected to head the national group.  Bob Thornton
also announced that the NACC has reinstated the DCC and that the new local
offices will be at 701 Mercantile Securities Building1802 Main. At that time the
DCC had approximately 1000 members and only one resigned after the McKee
disgrace. Thornton reminded the press that the DCC and its director Ahas no more
authority than the PTA.@(Dallas Morning News, March 17, 1972).
R. L. Thornton, Jr.  has to be considered, along with Logan Mayo and others,
as a principal force is restoring the Greater Dallas Crime Commission. Despite
growing up in the shadow of his father, he managed to succeed as a civic and
business leader. In addition to his role with the GDCC, he was a banker, he helped
create the Dallas County Community College, was on the board of Trustees of
Texas Women=s University, was trustee of the Texas Research Foundation, trustee
of the Southwestern Medical Foundation, a member of the board of development of
Dallas Baptist College and on the advisory council of Callier Speech and Hearing
Center, a director of the State Fair of Texas, the American Cancer Society, Dallas
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Historical Society, Greater Dallas Planning Council and the YMCA. There were
many others.  He died in 1992.
Membership figures seem to have been varied during this period since a year
later Thornton stated the membership level was approaching 150. (This may have
been the difference between the mailing list, individual and corporate members and
those who had not paid the annual dues.)   Thornton acknowledged that at one point
during the past year the membership waned to 65.
Discussion
The story of McKee and his downfall was an embarrassment to Dallas and
the GDCC. It could easily have been the end of a well-established organization.  It
would not have been too surprising had the Commission ended in 1972. What
occurred was the realization that it was not a one-man organization, and never had
been. The men, later the women, who took control after McKee were determined to
restore the luster of the citizen=s crime control body.
McKee’s demise, also illustrates the problems that occur in volunteer
organizations. It may often happen in non-criminal justice agencies but when it
occurs in law enforcement related groups it tends to be of greater impact. Perhaps it
demonstrates the need for professionals within the law enforcement community to
be wary of depending on the help given by private agencies.  
McKee became a convicted felon and was an impostor, but continues to
have loyal supporters in Dallas many years after his death. Others support the
changes he made while running the Crime Commission. Beyond these personal
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views, an examination of his leadership reflects both positive and deleterious
interpretations of the 1958-1972 period. 
McKee was a self-made man, although it is hard to determine from this
distance, which man. There is little known about the Zollinger identity, but the McKee
persona rose from a line worker at the Ford plant to a senior executive there, the
number two man in the Texas Shriners and the symbol for anti-crime efforts at the
Dallas Crime Commission. Many of his programs were far-reaching and even
progressive by today’s standards. He advocated licencing of firearms, favored better
education for inmates and tried to get legislation to seize the cars of drunk drivers,
suspend or remove their license and force them to submit to blood test. At the same
time he believed that persons who advocated liberal political positions were un-
American and people who disagreed with him were anti-crime. 
Perhaps, McKee fits into the category discussed earlier, that some people
simply should not be allowed to participate in anti-crime groups, (Grabosky, 1992).
Despite the vagueness of Grabosky’s position, no one can control the participation of
individuals who wish to indulge in crime commissions other than the commission. It is
not likely they would even today reject someone with the abilities of a John McKee. At
the time of his service he was despised and feared by many local leaders who seldom
criticized his activities until after his public demise. His leadership in other areas were
equally progressive. 
McKee wanted local businesses to be responsible for their own safety and
protection. He vehemently objected when he discovered the district attorney was
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spending inordinate time collecting bad checks when he viewed this as a primary
function of the businesses who failed to exercise caution when accepting checks. Much
like a recent examination of police alternatives theories, private business, particularly
insurance companies are beginning to adopt more positive actions toward anti-crime
efforts. Often, it is to the insurance company’s best interest to “persuade” clients to
take on crime prevention activities that would tend to make the company less
vulnerable to crime. Examples include better burglar alarms, more scrutiny of
employees, private patrols, and other improvements that lowers the potential exposure
of the insurance company which improves its profitability. It also enables the insured
to pay lower rates to the insurance company (Roach et al, 2000).
Obviously, it is not always a win/win situation but it helps reduce the
need for more police presence on the insured property. The essence of this theory is
that as private interest realize that police cannot handle all criminal problems, it is up
to the companies to take steps that reduce its criminal profile. The police have the
authority of the state behind them and can and do often make demands on private
industry to help themselves. This coercion has limits but the marketplace has authority
that transcends state controls; i.e., profits. If the insurance company will not insure
them, the client company may not exist. Thus, when the insurer demands changes, they
usually happen quickly. In many cases the company’s premium cost is reduced
proportionally and it may have fewer crime problems.
The article is clearly accommodating of crime commission development since
many of their  members are and have been insurance company’s executives who
72
wanted to develop programs that would reduce their companies’ exposure to criminal
losses. Crime control is thus transferred from the police to the marketplace. This
represents a return of control from the traditional police representing a secondary
authority to the “primary” control of the stakeholders.  Through this means the
insurance companies, for example, “. . .  constrain the activities of actual or potential
policyholders, and that are aimed at reducing criminogenic opportunities ” (Roach et
al,2000).
There has been a large increase in third party policing, particularly within the
last decade. If this trend continues, the historical direction of the crime commission
would be prescient in that they have often made strides toward the efficacy of
businesses taking positive actions to reduce their crime exposure. They have often
chided organizations to protect themselves. These initiatives include fingerprinting
check writers, better identification, rape prevention counseling, protecting property and
other crime prevention methods. Many of these initiatives began in the 1950s and
continue today through commission committees and programs.
McKee could be viewed as a forerunner of this program. He represented a
mixture of the positive and negative, and a conservative and liberal interpretation of
anti-crime philosophy. Many historical figures are highly regarded in some areas and
severely criticized in others. When he decided to try and protect his fraudulent
existence, he ended his career in a deceptive cloud of his own design. 
5 It is interesting that this was considered a priority since none of McKee=s errors was




 The Story Continues
No one likes starting over. But after the initial surprise and disappointment
with the announcement of McKee=s indictment and masquerade, a few members made
it their business to continue the Commission,  with new leadership and new
organization guidelines. 
The new administration of the Greater Dallas Crime Commission was a   
team effort. A $20,000.00 consultant study paid for by the Citizen=s Council,
completed in 1972, recommended positive programs and the termination of
investigative activities.5  It also recommended a permanent paid executive director.
This position would not be implemented until 1986, partly due to funding problems.
Logan Mayo, would become a largely unpaid Managing Director for about fifteen
years. As funding became available he was given a minimal salary. Mayo said in a
1999 interview, that Bob Thornton told him the Commission would be able to pay for
his parking if he took the job. Mayo had recently retired from Sears and would relish
the job with the crime commission.  Among the new leaders were R.L. Thornton, Jr.,
Maurice Acers, Clarence Talley, Logan Mayo, Ben Lipshy and W. R. Montgomery.
Montgomery told the newspaper in 1972 that the GDCC would concentrate on
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programs to support the police and cooperative efforts with other interested parties.
Mayo told the same newspaper to examine the Commission=s  work with the Salvation
Army to provide overnight housing for recently discharged prisoners, holding
shoplifting seminars with the police, providing  pamphlets in ALock Your Car-Pocket
your Key@ programs and A Protect your Assets@ program. GDCC also studied a venture
in Florida called AThe Seed@ to provide drug treatment for teenagers. Talley had in fact
traveled to Florida and New York ghettos to study drug problems and solutions for use
in Dallas (Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).
By 1974 the membership was back to 167. Logan Mayo began to represent the
newly reorganized GDCC, as its Managing Director. He made speeches around the
city and the country. Eventually he would be elected president of the National
Association of Citizen Crime Commissions with other cities asking him to visit to help
them establish their commissions. During Mayo=s years as the administrator of the
GDCC, he would retain the title Managing Director. (McKee had been President and
Managing Director) Thornton was President.
The GDCC became a supportive organization rather than one that conducted
investigations or sought dramatic headlines. They would rarely publically criticize any
of the existing agencies. A brief litany of their activities in the first  years following
McKee, reveals the effort and enthusiasm, the members put into Commission
programs.  They worked with the police to encourage citizens to mark their property,
to help reduce burglaries. This program, called  Big CIS (computer identification
system) asked participating homeowners to mark their property with a metal engraving
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tool.  GDCC gave 200 electric engravers to the police to distribute to citizens. Later,
the Boy Scouts of America, adopted parts of this program and volunteered to mark
property for citizens who requested help (Dallas Times Herald, July 6, 1973).
GDCC started the Helping Hand Program to assist abused children or simply
provide a safe-haven for children going or coming from school. The undertaking
identified individuals and their homes along routes used by school children; these
homes were given decals which allowed youngsters to recognize the residence as a
safe haven if they feared for their safety.
  The ALock your Car and Pocket the Key@ approach operated successfully for
years. In 1972 the Commission had distributed 10,000 circulars to encourage this
simple but effective idea, alarms for cars and automatic locks and remote access were
not common in 1974. 
By May of 1973 AEn-Garde@ was the new name of the GDCC newsletter. The
new officers were: President R. L. Thornton, Jr.; committee chairman included the
Research Causes and Prevention of Crime Committee, George Jalonick; the Juvenile
Committee, George Dehl; the Enforcement Committee, Laurence Melton; the
Membership Committee, Sam Wiener; the Financial Committee W. Ray Montgomery;
the Drug Abuse Committee, Clarence Talley; the Publicity for the Commission was led
by Al Garrett; the Planing Committee, Charles E. Watson; Russell Perry headed the
Legislature Committee. He would subsequently replace Thornton as President (“En-
Garde”, May 1, 1973).
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 Meanwhile, McKee was sued by the Scottish Rite Dallas Lodge of Perfection
for $119,535.00. They asked for an accounting for the loss from 1968-1972. A final
settlement could not be located. By 1975 McKee , 69, was working as a cashier at the
Hartford Building parking lot and claiming to be writing a book to tell his side of the
story. Apparently,  it was never completed.
The GDCC began to seek more minority members. One 1950 board member
stated in a 1974 news article, that the DCC needed to increase the scope of its members
to include females, members of ethnic groups and a  Abalance@ from the community
(Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974). 
 GDCC selected an annual meeting speaker who was able to replace some
luster lost after the McKee demise. John McKissick remembered in 1999, that working
on the preparation for California=s Governor Ronald Reagan=s 1974 visit as one of the
highlights of his early years in the Commission. Governor Reagan was beginning to be
seen as a national figure. 
 The GDCC sought and attracted other prominent speakers from the earliest
days to today. Estes Kefauver was a speaker in the first year of the Commission,
Governor Alan Shivers, Janet Reno, Jesse Jackson, Bill Clements and almost any state
official were regularly brought in as guest of the Commission. The respect held for the
membership and its influence, was a major reason speakers wanted to visit the GDCC.
California Governor Ronald Reagan was the star of the 1974 annual meeting
and gave the DCC much needed local prestige after the destruction left by the
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McKee scandal. It would take several years however, before the Commission would
be operating on a sound financial basis. (Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).
The GDCC worked more closely with law enforcement agencies. They 
cooperated with District Attorney Wade on legislative changes to more easily
revoke bail and to allow appeals from pre-trial judicial decisions. Commission
leadership sought changes in the state law applied to search warrants, oral
confessions and electronic surveillance. They continued to emphasize the need for
more courts, the number of judges available for appeals and  streamlining appellate
procedures. The Bail Bond Committee, chaired by Maurice Acers, for  nearly
fifteen years, suggested an audit of the Sheriff=s Bail Bond section and  possible
legislative changes. The Legislative Committee led by Russell E. Perry  promoted a
constitutional amendment to permit denial of bond to repeat offenders, to allow
police to use  oral confessions, to provide for a summary procedure for destruction
of contraband, narcotics and drugs seized by law enforcement, and a statute
prohibiting enticement of juveniles into vehicles or other structures for immoral
purposes ( Dallas Morning News, March 29, 1974).
 The Law Enforcement Committee  met with the  Dallas Police Department
and encouraged them to train women officers to interview female rape victims, and
the idea was accepted.  Joe Balisteri of the Youth Committee, worked  through
established groups to encourage efforts in youth development programs since 
A...fighting crime without equal emphasis on delinquency prevention may be
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likened to the frustration of swatting mosquitoes while failing to put oil on the
brood pond.@ (Annual Report ,1974).
 Logan Mayo reported on efforts to start up programs to obtain citizen
participation in  projects such as the Neighbor-Help-Neighbor (eventually
Neighborhood Watch Programs) and a Women Against Crime group. There was
also a report by Mrs. Charles L. Vychopen on the need for a court observer
program. Mrs. Vychopen was one of the first female members of the GDCC along
with Ebby Holiday.
By December 31, 1974 there were 167 active members,  both corporate and
private memberships.  The number does not include the hundreds of others on a
mailing list who are at least partly active through meetings and committees, many
of these are from the law enforcement population. 
Russell Perry was named to head the GDCC in 1976. Perry, was the board
chairman and CEO of Republic Financial Services Inc. Also elected was Maurice
Acers, Joe F. Balisteri Jr., W. Ray Montgomery treasurer, George S. Nicoud Jr., and
Logan W. Mayo continued as Managing Director (under the new changes the title
was Executive Director but this title was not used until Greg MacAleese arrived in
1986).  
 The years immediately after McKee resigned were critical for the GDCC. 
Members were not ready to  Afold their tent@.  On the contrary, based on the events
highlighted above, it was one of the busiest periods of Commission history. 
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Members were motivated to ensure the GDCC did not close . Events and activities
mentioned above are only a sample of the work.
  Successes are made up of small details, that work, and some little things
began to happen that contributed to the Commission’s survival. An editorial in the
Herald in 1975 favored the idea of offering a reward for information leading to the
arrest of murderers. It had been implemented by 3,000 merchants and helped solve
a double homicide. It was now being formalized through the new Greater Dallas
Crime Council. They announced a $5,000.00 reward for a  robbery/murder in
Irving. Informants could call a number and use a number or code name to identify
themselves thus maintaining anonymity, a core requirement for the program=s
success (Dallas Times Herald, January 17, 1974). This was not a part of the GDCC
or Crime Stoppers, but certainly indicated the community support for such a
program. It would eventually become a major program of the GDCC.  The Aofficial” 
Crime Stoppers was at this time in its infancy in Albuquerque, New Mexico, led  by
a young policeman named Greg MacAleese.
Over the next few years the GDCC pressed ahead with  efforts to actively
involve more citizens in criminal justice issues. Lawrence Melton of the Law
Enforcement Committee relayed police citizen information that resulted in the
solving of an auto theft ring, shoplifting and house theft cases. He and John A.
Hammack passed citizen information to the police that uncovered a juvenile gang
engaged in breaking and entering in Oak Cliff.  This committee also gave out
10,000 leaflets encouraging school achievement and reasons for kids to stay in
school. 
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The Drug Abuse Committee set up a continuing drug abuse seminar for
young people that met once per week. They also arranged for the Texas Department
of Corrections (TDC) to send three young male inmates to speak to school groups.
The inmate visitation program continued for many years. Prisoners’ speeches to
young people were used to motivate and encourage juveniles to stay in school and
off drugs; to avoid the mistakes they had made that led to their imprisonment.
Cecil Mills led the Rape Prevention Committee in activities that would grow
and evolve for many years. At one time it was also called the Rape Committee, its
name and focus would unfold over the years.  His committee met with women=s
groups and distributed alarm whistles that women could use to signal alarm if they
were in danger. They met with the Rape Crisis Center to ensure women who needed
their help could do so. The Commission also purchased a film on rape prevention to
loan to interested groups. They presented programs for women with the DPD and 
they scheduled informational and educational programs for women in real estate.
They also worked with the Dallas Federation of Women=s Clubs in educating and
distributing the defense whistles. They analyzed the causes of rapes, and solicited
public service time for media spot announcements. They  worked with apartment
owners on training conferences. They were  investigating the scheduling  of
programs of self-protection for high school and junior high school girls and to
advise parents how to recognize sexual abuse in their children. This GDCC 
program was presented to the National Association of Citizen Crime Commissions,
meeting in Philadelphia, where it was adopted by several other commissions.
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The Operation Identification Committee, involving the permanent marking
of all personal property held considerable local interest and the committee members
appeared on television and made speeches to encourage citizens to participate.
 The Committee on Causes and Prevention of Crime successfully brought
about use of the Woodlawn Hospital as a minimum security jail facility.  It took
three years and the support of Sheriff Clarence Jones and County Judge John
Whittington before it was approved by U.S. District Judge Sarah Hughes. The
Commissioners= Court appropriated $400,000.00 for its renovation.
Commission legislative proposals included:  1. Revocation of bail  for repeat
offenders. 2. Making oral confessions admissible, Texas law did not allow oral
confessions except in specific situations. 3. Elimination of unreasonable delay in
courts, this revision would revise the speedy trial provisions. 4. Amendments to
Juvenile laws to allow law enforcement officers  to question minors.  5. Evidence
obtained through search warrants, later found to be improper should be allowed in
Texas when the officers were acting in Agood faith@(Summer 1989, The Informant).
 Maurice Acers,  the new President of the GDCC forecasted and was
rewarded with a  decrease in crime for Dallas.  He credited the decrease  in crime to
programs initiated under his administration. These initiatives included,
1.Organizing the North Texas Coordinating Council of Law Enforcement. This
organization became a valuable communications link for police agencies in the
region. 2. He and the Commission promoted the idea of Crimestoppers, this version
addressed efforts to encourage the public toward self-protective measures eg. Lock
your garage doors, lock your doors and windows.  He was active in keeping the
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local media aware of GDCC programs to keep the ideas in front of public; 3. New
billboards paid for by the Independent Insurance Agents of Dallas with anti-theft
messages; 4. Added 25 new members to the GDCC; 5. An Anti-dropout program
that furnished 40,000 anti-drop out leaflets distributed in Dallas, Garland,
Richardson, Mesquite, Plano, Rockwall and Royce City funded by DeGolyer and
MacNaughton; 6. the GDCC worked on anti-crime legislation for the state
legislature; 7. The GDCC helped the sheriff with bail bonds by asking for and
obtaining over 200 volunteers, many retired FBI agents, to help with the back-log of
paperwork; 8. GDCC also helped obtain development of the old Parkland Hospital
to serve as a minimum security detention center. 
 Acers was a former Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from 1934-1947. He was born in Dallas in 1907 and received his
Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1929 from SMU and his Juris Doctor from the
University of Texas. He devoted most of his business attention to Acers
Investments and Ebby Halliday Realtors. He was elected Chairman of GDCC in
1977.  The late Mr. Acers was the husband of current Commission member, Ebby
Halliday (1999 interview with Ebby Halliday; 1977-1979 Annual Reports).
The following was a partial list of GDCC on-going programs during the last
years of the 1970s: 1. Lock your Car and Pocket the Key; 2. Helping Hand; 3. Lock
your Home; 4. On Guard for Schools; 5. Operation Identification; 6. This is your
crime commission brochure which encouraged citizen membership and
participation in the Commission; 7. Swindle Protection for Senior citizens; 8.
Protect your Business; 9. Defense Whistles for Women; 10. Drug and gun
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destruction; 11. Citizen Block Partnership; 12. Rape Prevention/Self Protection
Tips; 13. Membership in the Dallas Alliance and Council of Governments; 14.
GDCC served as an advisor to citizens, churches, schools, and civic groups on
crime prevention; 15. Membership in the NACCC.
Managing Director Logan Mayo became the Commission=s representative at
national commission functions and continued  his work with Senior Citizens. He
remained an ongoing speaker at Senior functions for nearly twenty years. He also
presented and arranged for programs in churches with current inmates. By the
1990s, the Commission had established a Logan Mayo Award to symbolize an
individual’s devotion to crime commission efforts.
The Spring 1977 newsletter was called ACrimestopper@. In Vol 1 No 1 it
discussed the 500 people who attended the annual GDCC membership session. The
number in attendance reflected the popularity and support given the Commission.
1977 reflected the continued strength of the GDCC by attracting popular and
influential speakers. The 1977 Annual Luncheon was entertained by the State=s
Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby and the Speaker of the House Bill Clayton.  The
topic of discussion was a controversial wiretap law to allow state law enforcement
to use wiretaps in narcotic=s cases. Hobby was opposed to the wiretap law which
was endorsed by the Commission and Governor Dolph Briscoe while Clayton gave
it a lukewarm endorsement. Allowing opposing views was a common thread of
Commission programs. The law was ultimately approved by the governor.
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In 1978 the Texas Research League touted the GDCC as a model of how
citizens can fight crime. The city of Dallas was enjoying a decrease in serious
crime.  However, according to Cecil Mills, rapes were continuing to increase in the
city. The chairman of the renamed, Rape Prevention Committee, noted that Dallas
was ranked first in the nation in per capita rapes. It was  believed the increase was
caused by more opportunity since  more women were out alone at night, more live
alone, more travel alone. He promised to continue working with  women groups to
improve this statistic. GDCC theories about the rape increases changed too.
The next year, 1979, the new GDCC  President, John A. Hammack, wanted
to develop programs that would target adults and young people. Hammack hoped to
change the apathy of adults by getting them involved in Commission programs. He
believed the outlook of teenagers could be changed through youth development
initiatives and the drug abuse committee. Hammack obtained a charter for the A100
club of Dallas@, which is a nationwide charitable organization dedicated to
supporting local police. The GDCC  hosted a national NACCC meeting where
Mayo was elected the national president. This was only seven years after the Dallas
Commission had lost its membership in the national group.
 The GDCC also distributed a new drug abuse pamphlet in 1979, this one
updated the current data about drug use.  The Parole Committee continued working
with the Wayback House through fund-raising, and assisting the Red Cross to help
recently released inmates. The Wayback House supporters reported that offenders
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who use the facility are less likely to be repeat offenders. Wayback House continues
to operate in 2000.  
1980-1990
1980's  President Garland Neal announced that there had been a 13% 
increase in crime nationally. Dallas was not the only city with high crime rate but it
certainly was  a  “national embarrassment@. Trying to draw attention to the issue of
high crime, the GDCC arranged a press conference in Austin to announce support
of Governor Clement’s anti-crime package. Unfortunately, the press release  was
over shadowed by what was referred to as “the  tragedy in Washington, D. C.@ , the
assassination attempt against President Reagan (Annual Report,1980).
In 1981, the Commission held an appreciation luncheon for Governor Bill
Clements who was recognized as the Law Enforcement Man of the Year, a major
GDCC award. Shortly after his speech, the  GDCC received a letter from the
governor,  thanking them for their support of the anti-crime/drug package. Fourteen
of sixteen measures were passed by 67th Legislature including many that the GDCC
had been supporting for years.
The Commission did begin to draw notice to crime issues later in 1980. One,
was the beginning of the showing of the Crime Stopper program on Ch. 8 (WFAA)
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television which continues today. It enlisted public support to solve crimes through
re-enactment of the crimes.
A major event occurred in 1986 when the four major anti-crime programs in
Dallas, merged with GDDC, CrimeStoppers, the 100 Club and the Friends of the
Dallas Police Department. The merger meant that only one group would be
soliciting funds and there would be a cohesive organizational structure.
  A new newsletter was unveiled at the 1987 dinner, it was called AThe
Informant@. In it was reported that Crime Stoppers had led to the solution of 450
cases in 1987 and recovered $1.6 Million in property and narcotics.   The Auto
Theft Alert Program had asked local radio stations to broadcast descriptions of
stolen autos.  This led to the recovery of 208 of 285 cars reported stolen and 
announced on cooperating stations KMGC, Q-102 and KKDA.
Another public event was Crime Watch ‘88, an exposition sponsored by the
GDCC was designed to alert citizens to methods of crime prevention at home and
business. John Walsh, host of AAmerica=s Most Wanted@ television program, was
the keynote speaker at the “Forum on Crime@. The program and the exposition was
free to the public.
MacAleese , the new executive director as of 1986, told the executive
committee, in 1989, that funding was not complete for the production of
ACrackdown@ and it may not go on time. This was a major public event.  Crackdown
was an hour length video that reflected the violence and human loss caused by the
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illegal drug trade. MacAleese was planning to show ACrackdown@ in January 1990
with television channels 4,5,8 and Spanish station 23 simultaneously broadcasting
the show, and with newspaper and radio saturation on the same day. They had
received more funding from American Airlines, Domino Pizza and the Perot
Foundation. He was promoting the possibly of a cocktail party by Ft. Worth and
Dallas Mayors for the final funding of the production. In an interview in 1999,
MacAleese described this period as one of the most tense of his life. He said when
he received word of the final amount of funding, at Christmas, it was one of his
most treasured presents.
GDCC continued to press for its legislative agenda, some local and others
for statewide consideration. City Councilman Rolan Tucker asked for their help to
eliminate the name of those with burglar alarms from the Open Records’s Act=s
requirement that would identify homeowners with alarms which would help
burglars develop their targets. The Legislative Committee was working with the
Mayor=s Task Force=s on an anti-crime package preparing for the 70th Legislature.
The proposed legislative agenda included one that would increase the amount of
time served  for certain offenses such as murder, assault on law enforcement
officials, injury to a child or an elderly person, retaliation crimes or organized
crime. New laws proposed, addressed terrorist attacks, greater prosecution of both
parties for lewdness offenses, and would make possession of obscene photos of
children a criminal offense. Expansion of prisons was a priority and legislative
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changes would require inmates to pay for damage to state property. The
Commission studied the feasibility of the use of house arrest and whether better
educational opportunities for inmates should be offered by state prisons (Annual
Report, 1985). The Legislative Committee proposed and successfully obtained the
passage, in the 1987 session of: 1.Juvenile Certification/Juvenile Records changes;
2. Prison Reform-Good Time Law, 3. Joinder of Offenses; 4. Controlled substance/
Precursor Drugs; 5. Exclusionary Rule changes; 6. Civilian Insurance Inspectors; 7.
State=s Equal Access in Appeals; and the 8. Streamlined Effects of Appeals
Reversals. The GDCC also supported legislation to expand TDC by 10,000 beds but
the legislature only approved 6,000. The failures in this session included the refusal
to allow oral confessions and the legislature refused to pass racketeering in corrupt
organizations (RICO) legislation that would allow seizure of illegally gained
profits. A provision that required probationers to pay into Crime Stopper fund, was
discontinued. It was restored in the next session (Annual Report, 1987).
 This report described how the  members of the Parole Committee,  tried to
help ex-offenders with education and individual guidance. One inmate completed
241 courses in 31 months and was now employed full-time while another became a
preacher. The  committee=s work reported over  400  correspondence courses and
many trips to detention facilities.
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In 1989, an 18-point Criminal Justice Reform Package was presented at the
71st legislative session, of these, 11 passed and two were to be considered in the
special session.
By the 1988 annual membership meeting the focus was  on expansion of the
state prison system.  During the program, speakers on opposing sides of this issue
were given equal time. It reflected GDCC=s desire to hear both sides of
controversial issues. (Commission Memo,October, 1988 and Award Luncheon
Program).
Cecil Mills Rape Prevention Committee reported that Dallas had 1200 rapes 
in 1980. The committee’s operational theory had shifted to the idea that “women
have a right to go anywhere they wish@ without fear; that the motivation of rapist
was power and anger, not sex (Annual Report,1980). By 1987, the newly named
Crimes Against Women Committee worked with the DPD=s Child Sexual
Exploitation Task Force,  printed and distributed bumper stickers  urging people to
call with information about sex crimes involving children, held a  forum on family
violence and  reviewed treatment programs for sex crime offenders and the impact
of pornography on citizens in Dallas county (Annual Report, 1987).
Bail and probation changes have always been a priority of GDCC. In the
1980s, Maurice Acers continued his work on the Sheriff=s bail bond and warrant
problem. Acer’s Bail Bond and Warrant=s Committee discussed with the Sheriff the
idea of the newspapers printing all the names of wanted persons. After examination
90
of some legal issues they agreed that the Sheriff would select ten and later twelve of
the most wanted felons. The $2000.00 fee was borne by the GDCC.  Citizen
participation was almost immediately successful in locating many of the fugitives.
A variation of this idea continues today.
     MacAleese reported in  September 1, 1987 that a  study by the DA=s
office demonstrated that 1,918 defendants were tried with 1,455 convicted. More
than 1,000 received sentences of probation or less than one year in jail. 381
offenders were sentenced to TDC for an average time of 12.7 years. During this
time TDC released 497 parolees to Dallas County. Thus Dallas gained 116
convicted felons during the period.
Part of the causes of the probation sentences was related to the needs of a
new jail. The Commission’s Jail Capacity Committee, at city council=s request,
researched the needs of the jail. It reported to the council that there was a need for
an additional 2400 jail beds. Paul Spain, committee chairman disclosed that  AWe
agree that the socioeconomic causes of crime must be studied and, if possible,
solved. However, we also believe that a convicted criminal must serve his term.@
When he presented the Jail Capacity Committee report to the Dallas County
Commissioners= Court in July  it was severely criticized as A irresponsible@ by some
but most were courteous and generally supportive of the call for more beds.
However, a few  years later, the county=s own study would agree with that of the
GDCC.  
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GDCC has continuously been involved in anti-drug efforts. The  Drug
Abuse Committee arranged the visit of inmates to schools through the Inmate
Visitation Program,  raised money to purchase five pair of wide-angle binoculars
for the Narcotics Division and were  briefed by Phil Jordan on Drug Task Force
work. Jordan, was the Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
he asked the Commission for help in securing state legislation to prohibit the sale of
chemical components to individuals that were used to make the methamphetamine
drug Aspeed@. This committee worked with other agencies: Dallas Challenge
(truants), Dallas Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse; Associated Texans
Against Crime (ATAC), Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the Mayor=s
Task Force on Drug Abuse.
On January 18,1989 the Commission discussed and adopted a position paper
that outlined its opposition to the legalization of drugs. Among the  reasons
specified was their belief that legalization was a quick fix and that proponents were
doing a disservice to drug abusers because many would not seek treatment if they
believe that their drug activity would soon be legal. It further emphasized that 
today=s drugs were more potent and addictive so that first-time users were more
likely to be addicted and even  proponents admit that legalization would increase
the number of users and the failure rate of  Acures@ are very low. The paper
maintained that  no one knew the genetic effects of drug use and legalization would
damage the nation=s work force.
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A major highlight of the decade was the appearance of U.S. Senator Phil
Gramm. The 1985 Annual Meeting was held April 11, 1985 with guest speaker
Senator Phil Gramm. 750 people were in attendance at the Hilton Hotel
(Crimestoppers, 1985). 
The Commission continued its support of the local police. The Law
Enforcement Liaison Committee (LEL) was created in June, 1987. Its primary focus
was to provide funding for training for law enforcement agencies. DPD had  a need
for advanced in-service training. The GDCC agreed to fully fund the first years=
training and one-half the cost in the second year. They subsequently, persuaded the
city council to take over supplemental training costs. The type of training
encouraged by the Commission was to train police to train others in their
department.
Commission support often included public statements such as the one in
1988 for Dallas Chief of Police Billy Prince who was given a vote of confidence by
GDCC after the Dallas Police Association voted no confidence. The GDCC vote
was 188 for Prince with 21 voting no confidence and 14 abstaining. The vote
received wide press coverage. It was taken after the Etta Mae Collins shootings that
led to firing of Officer Mark Krause. This was a rare occasion when the GDCC
made a partisan political statement.
1988 was a bloody year for the Dallas Police with several controversial
police/minority shootings and six Dallas area policemen killed. These tragedies led
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Dallas Mayor Annette Strauss to form an Advisory Committee on Crime. The
GDCC was well-represented on the committee. The Advisory Committee submitted
recommendations to the City Council which accepted most of them. One that did
not receive wide-spread support was a controversial one that advocated
strengthening the Police Review Board. Another recommended that DPD increase
the number of minority police supervisors.  GDCC would eventually publically
oppose the strengthening of the Police Review Board.
Internally, the GDCC grew in size and adopted some administrative
changes. Greg MacAleese became executive director in 1986. He was the founder
of the first crime stoppers program in Albuquerque, N.M. and founder of Crime
Stoppers International. He is the son of a former Canadian law enforcement official.
MacAleese became an Albuquerque policeman and in 1974, along with an
associate,  started the Crime Stopper program. He eventually was assigned to the
New Mexico governor=s office to coordinate a state-wide version of the program.
Shortly afterwards he was assigned to Texas Governor Mark White=s staff to help
organize a state-wide program here. He continued as an Albuquerque policeman
until he came to Dallas. In 1986 he was given the job of Executive Director of the
GDCC and the Dallas Crime Stopper=s Program  (Dallas Morning News, December
6, 1986 and MacAleese  interview, 1999)
Established programs continued to operate including Carole Young=s Crime
Prevention Committee that implemented the  Mobile and Business Crime Watch
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This program trained taxi drivers and utility service employees, who had two-way
radios, to aid police whenever they encountered criminal activity  (Annual Report ,
1987). The Crimes Against the Elderly Committee spent its time educating older
citizens about home and auto safety, rape prevention and even protection of their
purses. The committee and Mr. Mayo were widely known for their speeches at
senior citizens facilities well into the 1990s.  The Crime Victims Committee
compiled  and published  a handbook for victims. It provided a list of victim rights
under the law, how the criminal justice process operates, telephone numbers of
agencies to aid victim and much additional valuable data. It may have been the first
Dallas crime victim’s handbook. (Annual Report, 1987)  
 The annual awards dinner named Charlie Terrell as the recipient of the 
“Crime Fighter of the Year@ award for 1987 . He was selected  because of his wide-
ranging involvement in crime prevention efforts. He was Chairman of  Mayor
Starke Taylor=s Criminal Justice Task Force; Chairman of Mayor Anette Strauss=
Advisory Committee on Crime,  Chairman, Governor Clement=s Texas Criminal
Justice Task Force, and Vice Chairman of Texas Department of Corrections. 
On January 9,1989 Lou Robinson called a  meeting for the restructuring of
GDCC.  It is important, said Robinson, that the GDCC officers and committees
follow the By-Laws, and focus on the Life Cycle of Crime (emphasis added) only.
The life cycle of crime referred to, prevention, law enforcement, judiciary,
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incarceration and rehabilitation. This marked the first broad changes in the
administration of the GDCC since the end of the John McKee era.
    During the decade Michaux Nash Jr., a banker, was elected president
in1983. During his term a series of significant events occurred  including: 1.) the
growth in popularity of Block Watch, during 1984 there were 244 organized groups
and 136 in the process of organizing; on one occasion the Commission was asked to
help supplement the funding needed for organizing the Block Watches, by the DPD.
 Membership in the commission had increased to 323 as a new President,
Cecil Mills, of Mills Investments, was installed in 1983 . President John McKissick
was elected President of the GDCC in1986,David Dean, an attorney, was Chairman
in 1986 but resigned, due to business concerns in 1988. He was replaced by
Southwestern Bell executive LaRue Robinson.
     Other highlights of 1989 included the Executive Committee discussion of
a legislative bill that would provide $3.00 per bond for criminal justice oriented
grants, such as Crime Stoppers. It was suggested that the Commission liaison with
the judges, probably through a luncheon since the judges had some discretion in this
levy. Paul Spain discussed the recent Jail-a-thon at Valley View Mall that had
netted pledges amounting to about $78,000. Also in 1989, Robinson resigned as
Chairman and was replaced by John McKissick with Nathan Maier as President.
The decade of the 1980s ended on positive notes for most of Commission’s
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programs and events. It provided a base for their launch into the 1990s, the last
period of this review.
 1990-2000
Between 1990 and 2000, the GDCC continued and expanded it
programs and even added some new ones. This period illustrates the flexibility and
continued influence of the Commission. It would be led by a Coca Cola executive,
two lawyers, an engineer and a retired FBI executive. Each would leave their
personal mark on the GDCC and the organization would continue its growth as a
leading civilian criminal justice agency. 
 Mary Poss promoted a new Crime Causes committee that would eventually
include  42 citizens with time and resources to commit including people from DISD,
DPD, the District Attorney and the Sheriff=s office. It would attempt to present a 
“blue print@ of what should be done to reduce crime in the area. In May, 1990 Mary
Poss  was selected Executive  Director of GDCC replacing MacAleese who
resigned to form a private company to produce anti-crime programs. When
interviewed in Albuquerque in 1999, MacAleese indicated he made an additional
eleven Crackdown videos from San Antonio to Canada, he also served as Chairman
of Crime Stoppers International until 1996. During this time his wife and father died
in consecutive years and he moved to Albuquerque to help care for his mother. He
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is now President of Law Enforcement Technologies, Inc., which among other
missions designs defensive and non-lethal equipment for law enforcement. Mary
Poss was active in volunteer and civic affairs in Dallas for many years. Prior to
these endeavors she worked at Interfirst Bank of Dallas. She is currently a member
of the Dallas City Council and continues as an active supporter of GDCC. 
John McKissick stressed his belief  that the GDCC needed to focus on
certain programs and disregard others since it  cannot be everything to everyone. He
said that Ano one should ever use the name of the GDCC, or their affiliation with
this organization, to endorse any political candidate, ever@. He reiterated this in a
1999 interview. His position may have guided the decision when Sheriff Bowles
asked for help on art work for the front of the Frank Crowley Courts Building. The
executive committee decided to  offer vocal support only, Mary Poss volunteered to
coordinate an effort to solicit $250,000 but with no funds from GDCC. 
The video Crackdown@ was to be broadcast for a January 23 air date.  Mr.
McKissick  reviewed the  rough cut well in advance of the air date. (McKissick
recalled in a 1999 interview how onerous this job was for him. He noted that the
videos from South America of shootings and bombings were very bloody and left
nothing to the imagination.) A draft copy of the contract for ACrackdown@ signed by
Robinson and MacAleese provided some editorial control for the production. If
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McKissick did not agree with the final cut then GDCC would have been removed
from any credits for production.
 The programs of the GDCC were reaching out to more and more people. In
1990, the Dallas Morning News conducted a survey to determine how many
residents had heard of the Commission and where they had heard of it. The poll
reflected that in January-February of 1990 over 2.5 million citizens were aware of
the GDCC through radio and club announcements, but 1.9 million had heard of it
through the Texas ACrackdown@ broadcast on television
Support for the area’s law enforcement agencies continued to be a core of
the Commissions’ philosophy. In 1990, the Law Enforcement Liaison Committee 
received all funds from the Hackberry Creek Country Club golf/tennis tournament
who had donated its use of the club. The funds from the golf tournament were, used
to support GDCC programs, usually police training.
GDCC was also supplementing training budgets for law enforcement. It
provided DPD with $30,000 (most of this money raised by the annual golf
tournament). GDCC provided wanted felon photos, and re-enactments for television
Channel 8,WFAA. In addition to paying money to victim officers survivors, they
also arranged for the travel of the officer=s families from out of town to come to
Dallas for the funerals of officers killed in the line of duty (Dallas Times Herald,
May 19,1988). Training and assistance to law enforcement remained a high priority.
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GDCC=s Law Enforcement Liaison Committee had arranged for over
$70,000.00 in training funds for law enforcement agencies in one year. They also
provided much needed equipment not funded by the  agencies. The Auto Theft
Committee  provided support and arranged funding for the DPD=s auto theft unit,
most recently giving that group a computer system to help reduce auto thefts.
 GDCC avoids the label of lobbyist. The Commission does attempt to
include its agenda whenever possible and to use its members in influential
organizations.  The Commission’s political efforts are reflected in the numerous
laws and legal initiatives in the state of Texas.
GDCC was often called upon by Dallas area political leaders. In1992  they
were actively supporting MUSCLE- Mayors United on Safety, Crime and Law
Enforcement which was an association of Texas mayors working together on issues
affecting crime. Later, the Dallas mayor=s office called on  the GDCC for help in
winning one of the proposed new state prisons for Dallas. In 1993, Mayor Steve
Bartlett asked for the GDCC to review the current use of  the county jail and help
get agreement on priorities between the county judges, and prosecutors. 
GDCC speakers indicate the high regard most political leaders place in the
Commission. One appearance, likely caused a reversal of election fortunes. The 40th
awards luncheon provided a taste of notoriety at a GDCC sponsored meeting at
which both Ann Richards and Clayton Williams (candidates for governor of Texas)
were speakers. Prior to the speeches Williams refused to shake her hand and
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publically called her a liar. Many people believe that his ungentlemanly behavior
caused Williams to lose the election. This event took place 26 days before the
election and Williams was leading the polls at the time. 
In 1994, Reverend Jesse Jackson=s keynote address at the fall luncheon told
over 500 guests that people must focus on young people to keep them out of the
criminal justice system rather than simply building more prisons.  He said it is better
to spend scarce dollars to help children grow up with better morals and character
than to add more prison beds and worry about rehabilitation later. Reverend Jackson
received a standing ovation and the luncheon raised over $30,000.00 for the
Commission.
1996 was likely remembered for the keynote address of Oklahoma
Governor Frank Keating. This summer luncheon recognized his achievements
since becoming its governor. His leadership after the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building was exemplary and helped citizens recover from the
devastating deaths and injuries.
                  Shortly, after Buck Revell became Chairman of the GDCC, New
York Mayor Rudolph  Giuliani spoke at the 1999 Spring Awards Luncheon. 
Nearly 800 people heard him describe his anti-crime agenda. His speech was
carried live nationally by C-SPAN. Giuliani’s appearance was sponsored by the
GDCC with the cooperation of  the Rotary Club of Dallas, the Dallas Press Club
and the Dallas Council on World Affairs.  
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                GDCC also hosted a Texas Summit by the National Commission on
Model State Drug Laws at the Adolphus Hotel and was  addressed by House
Judiciary chairman Henry Hyde and Texas Attorney General Dan Morales.
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Attorney General Dan Morales,  Mayor Ron
Kirk, USA Paul Coggins and GDCC leadership discussed the changes needed in
drug laws. Sessions at the conference included prevention and treatment
programs. It is plain that GDCC can exercise  political influence.
               It is difficult to determine if GDCC’s political power is as important as
its emphasis on youth development and other juvenile intervention. The 1990s
reflect a major effort by the GDCC to spread its impact into youth programs. In
the first few years of the 1990s the Youth Crimes Committee (YCC) distributed
over 1.1million football cards and its Youth Essay Contest received 788 essays
with the winners receiving about $5,500.00 in prizes. Each first place winner
received $25.00 and a signed Nolan Ryan baseball. Crime Stoppers was also
trying  to implement a youth crime stopper program in the schools by  studying a
similar program in schools in Dade County, Florida they planned to bring into
DISD. YCC  was also growing, it had created a new program called ACruising In
the Right Lane@ that honors young people each month for doing well in school
and rewards their community involvement. It was for age groups 6-12 and 12-16
who were rewarded for making good decisions. The YCC was also working with
the Boy Scouts  to organize troops in neighborhoods where parents are
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unobtainable for varying reasons. The Youth Crime Council was in over 20 DISD
high schools who meet monthly to discuss  youth crime problems and prevention,
looking at peer mediation and organizing positive extra-curricular activities        
(Today, the YCC is in all DISD high schools.)
        In August, 1993, GDCC officials met  with leaders from area churches,
businesses, chambers of commerce and DISD to plan future priorities of the
Crime Commission. Youth crime was the most common concern of all the groups
who agreed it  must be the top priority. Work on prevention efforts and providing
positive alternatives for youth was critical for the future success of the
commission.  The Commission was working with DISD  to develop a school for
expelled youth, it was the role of the crime commission to obtain support from
foundations and corporations for this DISD effort.
             GDCC began a  Teen Fest in April,1994 which would showcase
bands and celebrities and food to bring out the youth. They would make available
information on gang intervention and anti-drug information. Teenfest continued
to grow with crowds of over 500. 
              On  August 18,1994, Elmer Murphey, III announced he had filed an
assumed name document on August 17,1994 for the Better Kids, Better Dallas
(BKBD) program. The kick-off campaign was at the Anita Martinez Recreation
Center on August 23, 1994  (seed money for this program was donated by Dr.
Bob Smith and directed by Donna Halstead.) Essentially, the program encourages
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young people to sign a Acontract@ with a  policeman to improve  their school
grades. The BKBD provides awards and scholarships to deserving Akids@.
BKBD=s fifth anniversary celebrated by creating a permanent endowment to
ensure the future stability of the program. They established a Law Enforcement
Explorer Scholarship program for future DPD applicants. 
               By 1997, GDCC youth programs  reached 20,000 young people from
lower elementary schools to college. Crime Stoppers programs reached into 10
additional high schools and middle schools. It is today very active in most
suburban schools but is not in the DISD. Each school Crime Stoppers program is
separately administered but is funded by GDCC.
YCC continues to increase the scope of these juvenile programs.  
Dallas ministers asked the GDCC to  help with summer jobs for youths and jobs
for ex-convicts. The Dallas Chamber worked on this with GDCC. Events
included a first ever Youth Crime Prevention Conference at El Centro College
hosted by the President of the College and DPD Chief Ben Click. 1999 concluded
with the formation of a task force on underage drinking chaired by USA Paul
Coggins. The urgency of this program was kindled by a DPD raid in Deep Ellum
in March, 1999 where several hundred  juveniles were cited for underage
consumption of alcohol.  
Crime Stoppers has been a strong program within GDCC since its
beginning.  Support for the Crime Stoppers program continued to grow with over
6 In an interview on August 23, 2000, Donna Halstead advised she was still active in
BKBD even though she was Executive Director of the Dallas Citizen=s Council now, in
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10,000 callers during 1992. The calls solved 454 felonies, including 19
homicides, 3 sexual assaults, 77 robberies and $593,340.00 in recoveries. In 1999
a letter from Chief of Police Bennie R Click of DPD summarized the value of the
GDCC and the Crime Stoppers program. Since Crime Stoppers arrival in the city, 
the program included 22 area cities, 3182 awards have been paid totaling
$826,695.00. 4109 felony arrest and $5,612,737.00 in recoveries have been made
by police as a direct result of the program. The Crime of the Week production on
local television and the Most Wanted Ads in the newspaper have further
contributed to public cooperation.
Toward the end of the decade there had been 50% increase in overall
membership in GDCC, and  DISD had added Campus Crime Stoppers. Other
programs included police mentoring, Kids and Cops Trading Cards, Handgun
Safety, Bikes for Kids, Red Ribbon Campaign, Mothers Against Teen Violence,
and Send a Kid to Camp. Better Kids, Better Dallas had advanced with Scholastic
Superstars, where over 5000 young people signed contracts with police officers. 
The Scholarship Fund offered 120  Aat  risk@ students an opportunity to further
their education through the Dallas County Community College ( DCCC).  The
Neighborhood Crime Watch, through BKBD, was provided with funding for 37
communities. This financial assistance was to create and sustain crime watch
groups.6
1994 she was on the City Council. She found the experience of working with the kids
in BKBD so rewarding that it was hard to consider it as Awork@. The kids and cops
aspect, are continuing to flourish. When police determine a need in their community
that needs funding and it involves children, BKBD works to furnish the necessary
funds. Her views of the future of the GDCC reflect the need to disassociate it from the
name Acrime commission@ perhaps a better title would be crime prevention. She
believes that Charley Terrell brought her into the Commission.
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The commission began to push more strongly for more minority
representation in its rolls.  They  talked about ways to  broaden  the
Commission=s ethnic base. There was agreement to call on the leadership from
the city’s  minority groups. GDCC has moved forward since its 1957 call for non-
violent integration of the public schools. It has many minority members including
a minority Chairman of the Board. As it moves into the new century, the






It would be easy to say that the GDCC or all civilian crime commissions
are a necessary and effective adjunct to the criminal justice system. They
provide funding to many worthwhile law enforcement endeavors including
Crime Stoppers and paying for training for many policemen. The Greater
Dallas Crime Commission is a leader in criminal legislation. Their work with
youth groups has become formidable. This crime commission also furnishes a
forum for announcing changes in enforcement or prison policy; and supplies
the necessary recognition and awards platform for the area police too. Crime
commissions must be examined also, for what they are not.
Crime commissions are an independent civilian group of citizens. That
they are not an extension of law enforcement or the judicial system is an
important distinction. Agencies that are a part of the GDCC, or other
commissions, can depend on them for support. That is the logical extension of
their benefit to law enforcement. If they fit into the overall body of the criminal
justice system, they would be closer to a political arm than the functioning
hands of law enforcement.
Early in this history, the new crime commission was compared to the
Citizen’s Traffic Commission because most of their recommendations were
approved by the city authorities. Most of the plans of the Greater Dallas Crime
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Commission were also approved at some level. A separate book could be
written about the legislation supported and approved, and initiated by the
Commission.  Commission anti-drug messages have continued for fifty years.
Early endeavors were somewhat naive, today’s programs, however, are
concentrating on youth education and encouragement which is a covert anti-
drug message with more positive effect than simply discouraging the use of
drugs. 
The work of the Commission in 1999 reflected their continued
dedication to improving the Dallas anti-crime skyline:
1.The 1999 State of the Commission report noted that Rider Scott had
drafted and got approved legislation to allow commission to retain surplus
probationary fees from crime stoppers this essentially means that the Crime
Stopper fund will be funded permanently.
2. The Dallas Bar Association offered the commission professional
membership which suggest that the relationship between the two groups has
progressed a long way since the disputes of the 1950-60s period. 
3. Ongoing programs: continue, including the Youth Crime
Commission, the Annual Golf and Tennis Tournament which funds the law
enforcement liaison committee. Last year it provided $20,000 for training.
4. The Anti-fraud committee provides an informational brochure for
merchants and white collar crime training for investigators.
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5. Crime Stoppers has been expanded to the Spanish station Univision
Channel 23.
6. Two fund-raisers generated $66,000.00, plus two grants from the
Hillcrest Foundation and the Hoblizlee Foundation totaling $100,000 which
pays for the expensive crime stopper telecast. Another corporate benefactor
was Raytheon Systems who contributed $25,000.     
Raising money is always an issue with GDCC and all other crime
commissions. It is important that they remain independent of government
support. Their role in supplying funding for various criminal justice functions
helps to maintain their influence and prestige. The GDCC’s budget for that first
full year was $28,750.00. 1990s budgets approach $350,000.00. Historically,
the budget for the Commission has reflected  its growth over the years. 
Other emanations from the crime commission were varied from
supporting  air conditioning courts for summer trials, poll taxes, bail/courts
reform,  prison farms (cost effectiveness), managing Dallas liquor licenses,
help for juveniles, integration, and narcotics problems. As McKee said  A.....we
are not elected, we are not paid and we answer to nobody@ or that there are no
Asacred cows”. There was wide-spread notoriety, for instance, when County
Judge Lew Sterrett disclosed he had revealed the information that led to the
DCC investigation of County Commissioner Bill Coyle.  Sterrett said he asked
the DCC to investigate all the commissioners, including himself, to ensure
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fairness. Sterrett recognized the perceived impartiality of the DCC.  Other
commission members too recognized that simply putting people in jail failed to
address root issues of crime.  Commission member Joe Balisteri said that only
emphasizing punishment for juveniles may be likened to the frustration of
“swatting mosquitoes while failing to put oil on the brood pond.@ (Annual
Report , 1974).
An interesting, and revealing,  observation occurred after the demise of
McKee. The people who assumed leadership did not have a professional or
financial incentive, to help resurrect  the Commission. Some were not a part of
the McKee administration consequently, there was no embarrassment factor,
nor were their businesses to suffer without the Commission. History’s
perspective reflects that perhaps only their egos were at stake; that they
surmised that since all  were involved in this project it was not going to  fail on
their watch. Very little changed in the years following 1972.  The Commission
continued to grow and expand its cooperative programs. Eventually, the
executive director’s position was enabled and an executive board and a board
of directors ensured a thorough administration of programs and administration.
Other than the elimination of investigations, little had changed. 
Concern about narcotics and support for law enforcement continued but
the commission began working closely with other agencies: Dallas Challenge
(truants), Dallas Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse; Associated Texans
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Against Crime (ATAC), Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the
Mayor=s Task Force on Drug Abuse. Later programs would include a greater
concentration on juvenile intervention and community efforts to remove blocks
that served to limit, personal advancement of poor or disadvantaged youths.
The Commission would continue to lobby for larger and better jails and prisons
and to increase prison terms for some offenses.
It is not likely that the Commission changed due to analysis of criminal
justice theories and research. Both McKee and the first Managing Director
Steve Reynolds discussed some aspects of the environmental impact of crime
and the dislocation causes of criminal conduct. There is no indication that
either of these studies affected Commission programs. That does not mean that
Commission policy was not influenced by changes in the community.
This thesis began with the premise that the Commission provided an
organization for citizens to help with the criminal justice system. The
population must be involved because the police cannot provide  protection
without community participation. People who are drawn to Commission work
are professionals, businessmen who have a financial and social interest. They
want to see changes and believe they can influence those changes. It is not by
design that many of the functions of the Commission are supported by much of
the current research directed at citizen’s roles in anti-crime efforts.  
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Writers are often critical of efforts to simply enforce the law and not
attempt to create more local solutions and crime preventative measures.
Authors Rose and Clear theorize that allowing the state to take over the social
control efforts of the community may tend to weaken local controls. They
propose that by taking more and more criminals out of the neighborhood the
local networks of controls are weakened or broken. Additional police brought
into the area discourages many residents who then leave the community,
diluting their influence as well (Rose and Clear, 1998).   Rose and Clear argue
that when neighborhoods reach out for the secondary control of the state,
usually represented by the police, they are usurping any existent primary and
parochial controls. The social disorganization is further reduced because the
outside repression, the police, requires little community allegiance. The outside
authorities do not have the need to interact with the neighborhood as does the
residents who live therein. When the outside sources remove miscreants from
neighborhoods there are mixed messages sent to the community. Some arrested
individuals, have legitimate jobs, have families who depend on them for
support and are believed to be a benefit to the population. Others have offered
little of value to the area, were unemployed or were engaging in criminal
conduct. Despite this, when each returns from prison, they bring with them the
legacy of prison-hardening and new ways to survive as a community thief.
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They serve as poor examples for their children and others who once considered
them a useful neighborhood asset (Rose and Clear, 1998).     
Social disorganization, as described by the authors, is an ongoing
concern for  the greater community. As social policy continues to add more and
more to prison rolls, the momentum places a greater strain on the remaining
community members. The constant stress to survive and thrive without
husbands, fathers and wage-earners who are incarcerated appears to aggravate
existing disorganization. Rose and Clear believe that this policy needs to be
reexamined and methods studied to increase the local community controls
reducing the need for the intrusion of police. This research could be easily
tailored for crime commission application in selected neighborhoods.
Neighborhood policing, training and educational opportunities could make a
significant impact in a community sliding toward this type of disorganization.
Commission programs, including the YCC, BKBD and Teenfest are suggestive
of the type of community help the authors discuss in their article.
Parallel support of this, in an article called “Third-Party Policing@, has a
narrower definition than other research has described. It refers here, only to the
use of civil police powers over constituents. If the police believe a segment of
the community is either doing something or not doing something that creates or
allows crime, the police use whatever civil coercive power is necessary to
correct these errors or omissions.  An example would be landlords and bar
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owners who have the civil responsibility to ensure their properties meet local
codes, (Eg., Bars that are too close to schools and churches, drug use in
properties that expose the neighborhood to unnecessary criminal risk) 
(Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998).
A central theme of the article addresses the essential need of individuals
and groups to take actions either with the police or co-related to  them, to
reduce neighborhood exposure to crime. This may include landscaping,
cleaning up vacant lots and houses, or generally, to Afight back@ against
neighborhood decline. The authors focus on the need for the police to remind
community members of the civil requirements in order to avoid fines, civil
suits, police surveillance and raids to name a few. This idea, which is a core
element in community policing, is needed to push local areas to do the right
things to get started toward a better community. It is predicted that once begun
the long-term benefits will keep the area moving in the right direction 
(Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998).
Buerger and Mazzerole describe one issue that could be a menace to
third-party policing. Today the civil issues serve the police as a vague threat to
uncooperative property owners. The warnings are in the same milieu as civil
forfeitures which are being criticized and challenged in court. It is not an
advantage to the police or the community for these local civil codes to be
placed in the criminal code. Today, as the somewhat nebulous warning, it
allows the police to work with the community to develop a compliant
atmosphere without having to address the problem in court. 
114
 The authors use existing literature to establish the perimeters of their
study and examine two specific groups that illustrate the success of this
method. Too often communities rely exclusively on law enforcement when the
local citizens may be the answer to crime problems. Like Davey, below, the
views held by Buerger and Mazzerolle provide another framework that crime
commissions could use to encourage and direct community actions to reduce
crime. 
Another view of how a civilian agency may target social disorganization
problems discusses the type (emphasis added) of social contact. Traditional
views rely on interaction among neighbors to control crime in the community.
A recent writer examines the type of social contact that most retards crime;
frequent or sporadic association with the community. Most prior studies did not
fully inspect these variables.  The author wishes to measure the type of social
contact that most effectively minimizes neighborhood crime ( Bellair, 1997).
Bellair’s research was conducted through surveys of public
victimizations of 12,019 households in 60 neighborhoods in medium
population SMSA cities in 1977.  He included two dummy variables in each
equation. The neighborhoods were randomly selected from the telephone
directory. Variable index crimes of burglary, auto theft and robbery were used
to measure the victim rate. It also included those neighbors who get together on
a daily, weekly or monthly basis. Belair=s analysis indicates a strong correlation
between frequent and infrequent social networks and the reduction of crime.
This is not as apparent as would be anticipated; both frequent and infrequent
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contacts are necessary. It is promulgated that the frequent contacts supply one
type of control and the infrequent contacts allow some members of the
community the physical and time separation to perform mediation and
counseling for the individual. His study does reflect the success of
neighborhood networks in mostly heterogeneous communities, those with
racial and ethnic diversity appear to have difficulty maintaining the collective
networks.
The author=s work is another that could be a guide for crime
commissions. Based upon his descriptions, Neighborhood Watch, Night=s Out
and several of the youth programs, could be interpreted as events both drawing
communities together but also providing periodic meetings to reward and
express concern about criminal events in the neighborhood. Generally, there
would be encouraging community meetings, discussions and efforts to
encourage the area’s residents. Crime commissions, through their networks and
programs can provide the impetus and funding to decrease the social
disorganization that contributes to crime.
Warner and Rountree ,1997, believe that social disorganization theories
may not be applied as easily as some research indicates in prior articles.  Their
study indicates the local primary controls may help reduce crimes of violence
but not those of property crimes.  Further, there appears to be little indication
that poverty and heterogeneity are mediated by neighborhood association.
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These points would tend to diminish historical dependence on social control at
the neighborhood level based on several key elements.
Their study examined 100 census tracts in Seattle in 1990 and surveyed
more than 5000 citizens. This was combined with the annual reports of crime
by the Seattle police. It supported prior research reflecting significant violent
crime reduction in neighborhoods with strong local control. It conflicted with
earlier studies about local control to reduce burglaries. Further, Warner and
Rountree found little effect of local control in minority or racially mixed
neighborhoods. 
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity are not congruent to reductions in
neighborhood crime, particularly burglary. This suggests that such mixed
neighborhoods would require other guidance to reduce property crimes. As
applied to the crime commission research, this should encourage commission
efforts in projects designed to help neighborhoods assimilate and become more
cohesive units. This should help reduce the influence described in this article.
That is, commission efforts should be focused on the troubled neighborhoods
especially those with mixed or minority populations. Programs would be
designed to bring the residents closer together, forming a more cohesive
control group. 
Finally, a  primer for any crime commission addresses overall issues
discussed in this analysis. How to address social, community and crime issues
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and work to cut prison populations at the same time. While it is not a miracle
cure, it does consign many of the problems into a manageable whole. Fixing
Broken Windows could have been written as a guidebook for crime
commissions.  It proposes a retreat from building more prisons and attacking
the crime problem after it has happened; but to address the immediate causes of
crime. This is a follow-up to Kelling and Wilsons 1982 original proposal using
the broken windows’ theory. It is the simple view that a few Abroken windows@
may lead to more and more decline in the neighborhood guiding visitors to
conclude that no one cares for the building; if no one cares, then more and
more Awindows@ may be broken with impunity. This attitude can spread
through the neighborhood until it deteriorates into wide-spread disorder and
uncontrolled criminality. 
Using records from New York City of arrests, citizen complaints ,
subway ejections and similar citations from 1988-1994 the authors demonstrate
the success of the broken windows theory of crime control. It is a means of
increasing police visibility, enforcing social order and providing the
community with the opportunity to use its primary control (Kelling and Coles,
1996 ).
The authors discuss the dangers of Aorder control@ associated with this
theory. Their proposal is to enforce civil order at a level designed to control
crime without infringing on individual rights. Since many of the crime
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problems are not major or index crimes but those often associated with public
order, a change of police function would certainly bring about law suits by
defenders of the homeless and others who may engage in panhandling,
prostitution or other crimes identified with  public disorder. This is a concern
but should not be overriding as some action that has to change . . . since the old
system is failing. Citizen fear, much of it unjustified, and the massive
imprisonment of larger and larger percentages of the population is not helping
to reduce citizen fear (Coles and Kelling, 1996).
 Citizens realize that the police are not the ultimate answer to
neighborhood crime issues; they are. The author’s model describes the
community based solutions. The community must insist on a maintenance of
established standards and that police increase their presence by enforcing
minor offense violations. Reestablishing order requires many adjustments from
environmental redesign to meeting the expectations of the citizens. Once
established they must be maintained by the custodians. 
I suspect that crime commissions appreciate the focus of Broken
Windows as it represents an action program for most cities. Applying
community pressure along with increased police enforcement illustrates a
viable program. It also involves most of the commission membership
professions from insurance to lawyers and bankers since all would benefit from
a healthier and safer community.
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This crime commission began because the leading men in the city
decided it was needed to discourage the wide-spread criminal violence
occurring at the time. Many were likely motivated by the threat to their
economic survival and the demand for safer places to raise their families.
These are motivations today and will be appropriate reasons in the future. The
GDCC has been helpful to the community and law enforcement for fifty years
because it serves everyone’s purpose, most of the time.
It is interesting to speculate about the Commission’s leadership sitting
down with criminal justice academic professionals and debating the Crime
Commission’s goals. Certainly, the Commission has supported the expansion
of the prison system but, it was at a time when no other alternative seemed
available or achievable. These same leaders were also responsible for trying to
help new prisoners adjust to post-prison life, and encouraging underprivileged
young people to be better students, to provide college scholarships for many
and thus change the community influence that caused many of their peers to try
crime.
This review has shown that the Commission usually wants to use its
influence in a more productive and efficient way. Few would agree with the
writer that they are trying to control the minds of young people by placing
them in prisons; they know that does not work. What they are trying to find is
the best programs that serve the community. 
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GDCC is larger and more involved with the community, now than ever
before, especially significant, since it could have easily been destroyed in 1972.
This Commission has lived up to and exceeded its promise of 1950. The first
year=s budget was a few thousand dollars, today it  exceeds $350,000.00. Much
of the change in the budget came about through the merger with Crime
Stoppers and others.  It would be hard to imagine Dallas  without the civilian
oversight and advocacy of the GDCC. Area criminal justice agencies depend
on it for support not provided by tax money. GDCC does not conduct
investigations, but it makes certain that those who do, have the necessary
training and equipment to do so.
Future Research
Proposed research would extend this study to each crime commission in
the United States, approximately 25.  A summary of each commissions history
would be compared to the crime rates of each area. Simultaneously, a survey of
the area’s law enforcement, prosecutors, judges and randomly selected citizen
groups would gather information about attitudes and experiences with each
commission. Newspapers in each area would also be examined to determine
the popularity or prominence of each commission. 
Due to the general popularity of crime commissions a response rate to
the survey should be higher than normal, perhaps within the 80-90% range.
Some minority groups in certain communities would likely respond less than
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favorably due to their early exclusion from commissions. Preliminary
examination may justify modified cluster sampling, eg. , the survey could be







Known crime commissions in the United States are listed below. The core list
was obtained from the NACCC. A letter was sent to each member on the list
with a request for general information about their funding and membership and
date of organization. A short description of the crime commissions that
responded is included. Not included are those crime commission organized and
funded by local city governments. A copy of a sample letter follows the listing. 
 
1.  Austin Crime Commission
P.O. Box 1382
Austin, Texas 78767 
2.  Business Crime Council of South Texas, Inc.
P.O. Box 460589
San Antonio, Texas 78246-0589
3. Chicago Crime Commission
79 W. Monroe St. Ste 605
Chicago, Illinois 60603
One of the most successful crime commissions and the oldest in
continuous existence is the Chicago Crime Commission (CCC) , begun in
1919. The CCC continues as one of the most active and prolific of the crime
commissions. In 1999 it had a budget of over one-half million dollars. These
funds came from busineses and members who support it with annual
donations. It also funds the publication of extensive research beginning with
organized crime but including gang activity and youth projects.  
4. Citizens Crime Commission of
       New York City Inc.
551 Fifth Ave. Ste 1125
New York, New York 10176
This crime commission was formed in 1975 by late U.S. Senator Jacob
Javits.  Its operations are similar to other crime commissions. No government
funds are used in its operation.
119
5. Citizens Crime Commission of Savannah
303 W. 36th St.
Savannah, Ga. 31401
This commission was organized in 1986. It too is a non-partisan and all
volunteer. 
6.  Citizen’s Crime Commission of Delaware Valley
1218 Chestnut St. Ste 406
      Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107
Organized in 1955 it works closely with area law enforcement. It
organized the city of Philadelphia’s Office of the Inspector General. Funding is
non-governmental. This commission is a not for profit organization as are most
of the crime commissions.
 
7.  Crime Commission of Portland Oregon
221 NW Second Ave. Ste. 300
Portland, Or. 97209-3999
8.  Crime Prevention Resource Center
605 E. Berry Ste. 104
Ft. Worth, Tex 76104-4300
9.  Greater Dallas Crime Commission, Inc.
Dallas , Texas
10. Illinois State Crime Commission
2900 Odgen Ave. Ste 109
Lisle, Il. 60532-1676
11. Kansas City Metropolitan Crime Commission
3100 Main Ste. 201
Kansas City, Mo. 64111
This is the only crime commission known to have been ordered into
existence by a grand jury.  The county grand jury issued decreed that
legitimate businessmen should form a citizen’s crime commission to counter
the rampant crime in the city. The commission was formed in 1949. It operates
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today in many of the same areas as does the GDCC, Crime Stoppers, it
organized an alternative prison program and recognition of criminal justice
professional. In 1998, its revenues exceeded $600,000.00. 
12. Los Angeles Citizens Crime Commission
503 N. Victory Blvd.
Burbank, Ca. 91502
13. Memphis-Shelby Crime Commission
50 No. Front St. Ste 650
Memphis , Tn. 38103
14. Metropolitan Atlanta Crime Commission
100 Edgewood Ave. Ste 1810
Atlanta, Georgia    30303
Atlanta’s crime commission began as a result of the urban riots of the
1960s. Then Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr. asked Judge Griffin bell to chair a
committee of civic leaders. Their recommendations led to the creation of the
MACC in 1966 as part of the cities Community Chest. Later their funding was
directed through the United Way. In 1995 the Atlanta Crime Commission
established a broader donor base and including corporate and individual
memberships, grants to supplement the United Fund income.
15.  Metropolitan Crime Commission 
P. O. Box 3485
Jackson, Ms. 39207 
The Metropolitan Crime Commission was organized in 1994.  It is
funded solely by the individuals and businesses it represents. Their programs
and goals coincide with the national organization.
16. Metropolitan Crime Commission
      Of New Orleans, Inc.
1440 Canal St. Ste 1703
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112-2735
17. Metropolitan Tulsa Crime Commission
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P.O. Box 1596
Tulsa , Oklahoma 74101
18. Mississippi Coast Crime
     Commission
P.O. Box 1962
Gulfport, Mississippi 39502
The MCCC was formed in 1970 to secure full-time district attorneys for
some local counties. They were successful and continued other programs
beginning as a watchdog to monitor local agencies.  . It too does not accept
outside funding.  
19. San Diego Crime Commission
7825 Engineer Rd. Ste 202
San Diego, Ca. 92111
The San Diego Crime Commission was formed in 1981. It is funded by
private contributions and is a not for profit corporation. It acts in a liaison
capacity with area law enforcement and works to help educate area youths to
avoid crime. 
20.  Wichita Crime Commission
125 N. Market #1115
Wichita , KS 67202
Wichita Crime Commission was founded in 1952 by 12 business and
professionals who were concerned about organized crime and poor law
enforcement. By 1953 their number had grown to 100 members. It operates on
self-generated funds. It focuses on youth benefits and support for area law
enforcement. 
H. Lee Latham





The Greater Dallas Crime Commission (GDCC) has asked the
University of North Texas (UNT) to write a history of the organization.  A part
of this history reflects on the growth of crime commissions around the country.
After consulting with the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions
(NACCC) your organization is listed as either an active crime commission or a
member of the NACCC. 
It would help us to include data about your group in the history. If you
have a brochure that describes your operation and history we would appreciate
you forwarding that to us at the above address. We have tried to find the
information on the web sites as available if we have somehow missed yours
please advise of the location. 
The information that is most valuable is the beginning year of your
organization, significant achievements such as crimestopper programs or
providing training for local law enforcement or specific funding programs. A
flow chart of your organization would be most helpful.  Please advise generally
of the type of funding projects used to obtain needed funds for your operation














Primary source material from this research was obtained from the Greater
Dallas Crime Commission. These included interviews with members and
officers. Also made available were original documents from the Commission=s
archives. Notes examined were from executive board meetings, memos from
officers and the commission=s newsletters. Some of the earlier budgets
remained in the Commission records. Secondary sources are as follows:
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